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Evaluation is creation: hear it, you creators! Evaluating
is itself the most valuable treasure of all that we value.
It is only through evaluation that value exists: and
without evaluation the nut of existence would be hollow.
--Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra
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SUMMARY

Organizational development is a central purpose of
evaluation.

Disasters and other emergency situations carry

with them significant implications for evaluation, given
that they are often unanticipated and involve multiple
relief efforts on the part of INGOs, governments and
international organizations.

Two particularly common

reasons for INGOs to evaluate disaster relief efforts are
1) accountability to donors and 2) desire to enhance the
organization’s response capacity.

This thesis endeavors

briefly to review the state of the evaluation field for
disaster relief so as to reflect on how it needs to go
forward.

The conclusion is that evaluation of disaster

relief efforts is alive and well.

Though evaluation for

accountability seems fairly straightforward, determining
just how the evaluation influences the organization and
beyond is not.
Evaluation use has long been a central thread of
discussion in evaluation theory, with the richer idea of
evaluation influence only recently taking the stage.
Evaluation influence takes the notion of evaluation use a
few steps further by offering more complex, subtle, and
viii

sometimes unintentional ways that an evaluation might
positively better a situation.

This study contributes to

the very few empirical studies of evaluation influence by
looking at one organization in depth and concluding that
evaluation does influence in useful ways.

ix

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview
Evaluation as a form of research is a practical
endeavor, manifested in action. Whether evaluation succeeds
in ameliorating the practice of the organizations that
employ it is a question that is gaining in relevance for
non-profits as individuals, corporations, and governments
increase their calls for greater accountability. At its
very root, the word ‘evaluation’ means ‘to seek out the
value of;’(Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2007) when an
organization evaluates its policies or programs, by
definition it is looking to determine value.

It is not

surprising, then, that the concept of use, or the newer and
more apt concept of influence, receives such enduring
attention in the evaluation literature.

As an enterprise

that purportedly exposes the value of a policy or program,
evaluation can generate concern over what its consequences
will be.
In the past two decades, both donors and the public
have called for higher and higher standards of
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accountability in international and domestic nonprofits.
Evaluation, consequently, has come under the spotlight as a
means to that end. The lingering question is whether the
influence of evaluation on an organization is merely
“window-dressing”, whether it includes or is limited to
accountability.

Nonprofits, working with limited

resources, cannot afford for evaluation to be ineffective.
This paper addresses the question of how the evaluation
process and evaluation reports affect (or do not affect)
the practice in a large well-known non-profit organization
and identifies the factors that expose these influences.
Evaluation use, or utilization, has been prevalent in
the evaluation literature for a few decades and refers to a
change resulting from an evaluation or an evaluation
report. Evaluators or organizations commissioning
evaluations often place high priority on using findings for
program improvement or, more broadly, to inform decisionmaking.

Use has been a central theoretical theme both for

evaluation and for research-generated knowledge.

However,

organizations often do not have formal mechanisms for
assessing whether their evaluations are used effectively or
not, and virtually none have a systematic means for
identifying indirect or unintended consequences of
evaluation.

In the case of nonprofits, this could be due
2

in part to limited resources; moreover, those donating to
nonprofits might prefer a more “direct” use of their money
than meta-evaluation activities.
In the evaluation literature, the term ‘use,’ and its
sister ‘utilization,’

have given way to the broader

‘influence’ (Henry & Mark, 2003; Kirkhart, 2000) in more
recent theoretical musings on evaluation.

This shift

reflects the limitations, semantic and otherwise, of the
concept of use, and opens the door for unintended and
subtle consequences of evaluating within an organization.
Few organizations have studied formally the instance(s) of
evaluation influence; perhaps this is in part because the
factors leading to an evaluation’s influence are poorly
understood. Henry and Mark (2003) tackle this in examining
the mechanisms which, for them, undergird the instances of
influence. A better understanding of these mechanisms, and
concrete examples, will go a long way toward helping
evaluators to dissect how it is that evaluations
potentially influence, and under what circumstances.

This

study contributes toward developing that understanding of
the mechanisms leading to evaluation influence by exploring
the extent to which an evaluation’s influence can be
anticipated or planned for prior to the evaluation’s being
carried out.
3

The twenty-first century has seen technological
advances, cultural trends, political situations, and
globalization unimaginable one hundred years ago. In this
short time frame, humanitarian response to natural
disasters and other emergencies has increased rapidly.
Disasters and conflicts themselves, of course, have been
occurring for thousands of years.

But never has disaster

media exposure made more individuals – and donors – aware
of the extent of devastation in disasters than in this
century.

With this added awareness comes an increase in

money flow and in response.

While greater emergency

response is a welcome development, it brings with it a host
of new challenges, such as being accountable for
responsible use of donor funds, standards for training of
crisis respondents, and timing of assistance,
communications, and security.
Among the most critical challenges for a humanitarian
aid agency, such as an INGO (international non-governmental
organization), is the dilemma of how to measure its impact
on a disaster scene.

This problem becomes murkier still

when aid agencies look to use evaluation findings to
improve their efforts for responding to the next disaster.
This paper examines the influence, intended and otherwise,
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of humanitarian relief evaluation findings in practice and
in organizational policy-making.
1.2 Research Problem
In view of the 2004 Asian tsunami and other highprofile emergencies such as the present crisis in Darfur,
international humanitarian aid agencies offer a rich forum
for examining evaluation influence on an agency’s practice.
Not only are such agencies grappling with how to use an
unprecedented amount of aid money responsibly and
effectively, but they are in the business of saving lives.
Neglecting to employ the recommendations from an evaluation
report could literally be a matter of life and death.
These agencies have been facing mounting pressure from
donors and governments to strengthen their accountability
practices and ensure transparency.

As a result,

humanitarian aid agencies are more and more frequently
obliged to conduct an evaluation as part of their
programming.

The question is whether evaluations go beyond

fulfilling donors’ accountability documentation requests
and affect agency programs and policies.
In the 1990s, a profusion of large-scale humanitarian
crises captured the world’s attention.

Notably, media

coverage of the genocide in Rwanda and Burundi awakened the
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public to the urgency of the human suffering there.

The

famine that befell conflict-ridden Somalia similarly
required a substantial response from the international
humanitarian assistance community.

The upheaval in Bosnia

exposed a need not just for relief and refugee assistance,
but also for rebuilding and development.

These events and

others sparked large-scale and visible responses from
INGOs. Significantly, the money flowing to aid agencies
from governments and from private sources meant a greater
call for responsibility on the part of the INGOs whose
programming depended on those funding venues. Furthermore,
INGOs, who often had an established presence in a crisis
area prior to the emergency response, began to partner with
the United Nations and with bilateral donor agencies for
service delivery and coordination.

These relationships

increased the clamor for evaluation of emergency programs
(Wood, 2001). Public concern for INGOs’ comportment grew,
with a corresponding demand for better accountability
(Ebrahim, 2003b). The number of INGOs increased as well
during that period. Though a spate of literature existed at
that point on evaluation theory and practice, little of it
addressed the unique needs and characteristics of the
humanitarian aid agency.

6

Types of donors to humanitarian assistance
organizations range from governments to INGOs to
individuals. Government money for humanitarian aid is often
channeled through government agencies established for this
purpose, as with the United States Agency for International
Aid (USAID) in the U.S. or the Department for International
Development (DFID) in the United Kingdom.

Money designated

for emergencies or disasters is usually coupled with
development aid budgets (Cahill, 2003). Donor money sources
include tax dollars, corporate and individual
contributions, and in-kind assistance. As the amount of
public and private aid has exploded in the last decade, so,
too, has the number and variety of INGOs and other agencies
working in emergency relief.

The United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the World Food
Programme (WFP) collaborate with INGOs to provide
coordination and direction to large-scale relief efforts.
The International Red Cross is a familiar figure in these
scenarios.

Upstart INGOs join the pool in seeking funding

and publicity with every disaster.

However, as of the late

90s, there were eight INGOs vying for and receiving over
half the total relief money: the Cooperative for Assistance
and Relief Everywhere (CARE), Save the Children, World
7

Vision International, the Oxford Committee for Famine
Relief (Oxfam), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF, or Doctors
Without Borders), European Solidarity Towards Equal
Participation of People (Eurostep), Coopération
International pour le Développement et le Solidarité
(CIDSE), and Association of Protestant Development
Organizations in Europe (APDOVE) (Simmons, 1998).

If they

are receiving relief money from the same sources, they are
also receiving similar pressure to hold themselves
accountable for their decisions and actions.
Simmons (1998)likens the competition among INGOs vying
for funds and media attention to a market system; Smillie
and Minear (2004)similarly label it an enterprise.

This

image of aid agencies as “corporations” in a “market” hints
at the potential for competitive interaction between
organizations and underscores the importance of
transparency and of organizations holding themselves
accountable for their “bottom line.”

INGOs, regardless of

common aims such as a desire to reach the greatest number
of people as efficiently as possible, compete amongst each
other both for funds and for share of the relief spotlight
in the media.

The perceived commercial character of the

INGO sector has provoked criticism in terms of how INGOs
operate and what motivates those who work for them
8

(Dichter, 1999; Fowler, 1997). This criticism further
emphasizes the importance of accountability and evaluation
for INGOs that face pressure to show how efficient they
have been with donated funds.
1.2.1 Disaster-specific Evaluation Standards
The attention to the importance of accountability
heightened in the 1990s in tandem with the increased
humanitarian relief response to a series of crises, but was
by no means a new issue of concern for INGOs.

INGOs have

long faced criticism for not making accountability a
priority; the very word “non-“ in non-governmental
organization suggests that INGOs are not beholden to
governments, nor bound by their regulations, in the way
that corporations, government agencies, or even domestic
nonprofits might be (I. Smillie, 1997).

The nature of INGO

work makes it notoriously difficult to evaluate: it is one
thing for a corporation to use sales as a benchmark for
product success, quite another for an INGO to measure a
concept so nebulous as “empowerment” in concrete terms.
This is especially true for INGOs working in humanitarian
relief, because often the problems they address are not
only complex, but also unanticipated; in a crisis
situation, obtaining baseline data can be daunting or

9

downright impossible.

The emphasis on accountability

resulting from the wave of emergencies and crisis response
funding in the 1990s brought to light a need for setting
widely applicable minimum standards for emergency response.
Five organizations or consortiums have attempted to address
this need through developing guidelines both for planning
and for evaluation.

Their foci range in breadth from

crisis identification and preparedness to post-crisis
learning and reflection.

These initiatives profess to be

complementary to each other, rather than competitive, in
function:
1.2.1.1 The Red Cross Code of Conduct
In 1994, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement sought the assistance of established INGO networks
to draw up a Code of Conduct for those agencies working in
emergency relief.

The Code of Conduct is designed to

recognize the internal and external pressures that INGOs
face in responding effectively and responsibly to
emergencies.

It is not intended as a mechanism through

which to sanction those who agree to it but fail to comply
with it; rather, it is a professional guideline.

Eight of

the largest disaster relief agencies signed on to the Code
of Conduct at its inception in 1994, and many more have
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since; it aims to be applicable to small and large agencies
alike.

The Code of Conduct is not so much an evaluation

measure or tool as it is a statement of an acceptable
behavior.
1.2.1.2 The Sphere Project
Sphere, initiated in 1997, is a collaborative effort
on the part of several international NGOs and the
International Red Cross. The project is predicated on the
notion of the human right to dignity.

This, for Sphere,

translates to a right to assistance for those whom a
disaster affects.

Its main products are a humanitarian

charter, a framework for quality and accountability in
humanitarian assistance, and a handbook of tools for
assuring quality in four areas of response:
•
•
•
•

water sanitation and hygiene
nutrition and food aid
shelter
health.

The handbook, The Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum
Standards in Disaster Response, aims to improve
accountability and quality of service provision.
standard has key indicators and guidance notes.
handbook was adopted in 1997 and revised in 2004.
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Each
The
Sphere

targets the practitioner and is more of an implementation
tool than an evaluation guide.
Sphere is noted for taking a “rights-based” approach
to disaster response.

The rights-based approach, as

compared to a needs-based approach, focuses on
acknowledging basic human rights as opposed to needs-based
service delivery.

In other words, rather than approaching

disaster response as fundamentally addressing a need, such
as drinking water, Sphere approaches disaster response as
addressing a human right, such as the right to adequate
food and water. The rights-based approach endures criticism
for not getting to the heart of the political context
surrounding a crisis (Hilhorst, 2002). Sphere also receives
criticism for being so general that it is difficult to
adapt to a particular context (O’Donnell, 2002). Sphere has
also come under scrutiny for representing the ideas and
priorities of developed-world professionals, thus leaving
little or belated opportunity for beneficiaries to lend a
voice (Dufour, 2004).
1.2.1.3 ALNAP
The Active Learning Network for Accountability and
Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) is, like Sphere,
an inter-agency collaborative effort.
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In addition to

attempting to facilitate learning and improved
accountability, ALNAP serves as a repository for evaluative
reports of the relief efforts of various groups.
intended as a resource for further learning.

These are

It publishes

an annual Review of Humanitarian Action in which it
compiles evaluation learning from member agencies.

It also

provides them with its “proforma,” an evaluation guide.
ALNAP is particularly focused on sharing of knowledge
between organizations.

It emphasizes improved quality as a

continual goal(Hilhorst, 2002). Better quality of
information exchange will lead to better tools for future
decision-making.
1.2.1.4 People-In-Aid
People-In-Aid is a human resources-oriented project
that maintains its Code of Good Practice.

The Code names

seven main principles and accompanying indicators and
focuses on a context-rich social audit approach.

It is

engineered as a tool for human resources management, but
professes to be adaptable to other audiences.

It is not

designed to be an instrument for measuring the success of a
program; it is simply a guideline for practice.
1.2.1.5 Humanitarian Accountability Partnership
International
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The Humanitarian Accountability Partnership –
International (HAP), established in 2003, is a regulatory
entity for international humanitarian assistance efforts.
Its ultimate mission is to respect the rights of the
intended beneficiaries of humanitarian aid through holding
aid agencies accountable to those beneficiaries.
Consultation and research on the part of HAP has led to its
development of seven core principles of accountability.
Members of HAP commit to striving to uphold these
principles in theory and in practice through self and
external regulation.
In accordance with its seven core principles of
accountability, HAP has developed accountability standards
against which its members can measure their own
accountability practice and identify their strengths and
gaps.

The accountability and quality management standards

are not meant to duplicate the HAP core principles; rather,
they provide an instrument for verifying whether a given
agency upholds a minimum level of accountability to its
beneficiaries.

HAP has an eventual goal of creating a

certification system through which humanitarian aid
agencies can seek officially to be named as being in
compliance with the core principles of accountability.
This is HAP’s main distinction from Sphere, the Code of
14

Conduct, and People-In-Aid: it endeavors to be measurable
and to measure.
Both practitioners and academic researchers use these
sets of codes and standards not only for planning relief
efforts, but for evaluating them.

Some commonly cited

strengths of these resources include inter-agency
collaboration and a rights-based approach.

The weakness

most often mentioned is the difficulty of complex
situational/contextual dimensions to which these fairly
generalized standards do not adapt well.

Also, the

complexity of arranging for beneficiary participation in
these relief efforts is an oft-cited challenge for these
standards.

Both Sphere and ALNAP are committed to a

minimum level of transparency and accountability in the
humanitarian assistance community.

Evaluations have the

potential to be a tool for promoting accountability and for
learning within an organization.

How to assess an

evaluation’s impact in terms of promoting organizational
learning is a difficult question given the variety of types
of evaluations and the range of quality within evaluations.
Though theory-driven articles on evaluation use,
utilization, and influence abound, there are few accessible
examples of tracking that influence within organizations.
In part, this has to do with the difficulty in defining
15

what constitutes influence within a given organization and
where that influence might surface.

Aside from direct,

instrumental use of evaluation findings, instances of
evaluation influence are hard to extricate from other
influences in organizational operating procedures and
policy decisions.

Furthermore, evaluation influence is new

and complex enough that few structures exist as starting
points for an organization wishing to assess the nature and
extent of evaluation influence within its practice.
INGOs have faced mounting pressure from funders and
from governments to assure their transparency in their
appropriate use of funds to conduct humanitarian work.
Indeed, compliance and oversight is a main purpose of
evaluation: Mark, Henry, and Julnes (2000)list the
assessment of how an organization meets rules and
expectations among their four purposes for evaluation.
Chelimsky (1997)discusses the “accountability perspective”
as one of three core perspectives an evaluator takes in
approaching an evaluation.

Accountability, then, is a

central function of evaluation.
It is one thing for organizations to confirm that they
comply with the expectations of major donors by conducting
an evaluation whose findings point to appropriate use of
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donated funds.

This is certainly a critical role for

evaluations of humanitarian relief efforts.

But if

evaluation also influences humanitarian aid organizations
in other ways, particularly in serving the purpose of
program and policy improvement (Mark et al., 2000), the
humble evaluation has the potential to play a central role
in helping humanitarian assistance INGOs to fulfill their
missions of improving, and even saving, lives.

The main

research problem addressed here is: evaluation findings may
serve a purpose beyond accountability in humanitarian
assistance organization, specifically one of project,
program, and policy improvement.

A dearth of recorded

examples exists of how and whether evaluations influence
humanitarian relief organizations, to say nothing of the
ingredients for a successful instance of influence.

This

research problem points to two main research questions.
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
A. Do evaluations of INGOs’ disaster relief activities
go beyond accountability to affect INGOs’ practice?
Though program oversight is a primary reason for initiating
an evaluation, a report that actually improves on service
delivery is valuable in a sector whose mission has to do
with bettering lives.
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B. If evaluations of disaster relief activities do
improve subsequent projects, what elements of the
evaluation process or report contribute to the
evaluation’s influence on programs and policies?
If indeed such evaluations do have an impact on the
decision-making around policies and programs, an
organization would benefit from understanding the factors
that contribute to the evaluation’s being employed
positively.

Those factors may be intentional or

unintentional.
1.4 THE CASE OF CARE
To address these two questions, this study considers
the case of CARE, whose emergency response work is wellrecognized.

CARE’s humanitarian assistance work is a

compelling single-case study because it is both
representative of typical INGO work in this area, and
unique in its particular structure and dynamic.

Virtually

all of the evaluations considered in this study were of
responses to emergencies to which other prominent INGOs
also responded.

By analyzing the case of CARE, this

research purports to offer a window on the evaluation
characteristics and dynamics typical of INGOs with a
similar degree of reach and exposure.
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CARE got its start in the 1940s directly after the
second World War, when it formed to offer succor to war
survivors.

Though the organization’s work today is not

limited to humanitarian relief, its main mission is to
fight poverty, in part through emergency response.

Whether

the emergency is a natural disaster or a conflict, CARE
participates in several types of projects, including
temporary shelter construction, food and water provision,
medical care, and rehabilitation strategies such as
economic development.

CARE’s name is so well-recognized

that it received a staggering amount of donations following
the Asia tsunami of 2004.

Because of this name

recognition, it is particularly critical that CARE hold
itself accountable to itself, its donors, and its
beneficiaries.

Because the organization dabbles in so many

areas of relief and development, including education,
HIV/AIDS, economic development and water/sanitation, its
ability to follow up on evaluation findings to improve
programming can distinguish it as a premier organization in
the world of emergency response.
CARE, as one of the eight largest and farthestreaching agencies involved in humanitarian assistance
(Cooley & Ron, 2002), has been a major recipient of the
increased flow of funding to disaster relief efforts, both
19

from USAID and from private individuals and foundations.
As a signatory of the Red Cross Code of Conduct and as an
active member of Sphere, ALNAP, and HAP, CARE is a forcible
presence in the multitude of initiatives to harness
humanitarian aid organization accountability.

CARE’s

current emergency response efforts extend from supplying
food and water to providing shelter to facilitation of
health care provision and delivery of essential supplies.
Though CARE has periodically conducted in-depth
evaluations of its emergency response activities, only in
recent years has the organization made a concerted effort
to evaluate every emergency response project with an eye
toward transparency through making evaluation reports
widely available.

Availability is not limited to internal

CARE staff; large evaluations are also available to other
NGOs and agencies involved in relief work.

This commitment

to transparency reflects an international focus on
coordinating and improving on current emergency response
practices.

The choice of CARE as a study subject precludes

an overly general conclusion as to evaluation influence in
nonprofit organizations. An international INGO with
multiple large funding sources is part of a small group of
contextually distinct nonprofits for whom milieu is so
integral to their operations that their accountability
20

practices do not mimic those of smaller-scope nonprofits
with fewer funding resources(Ebrahim, 2005).
Within CARE, organizational decision-making happens
within several tiers.

CARE itself is a confederation of 11

member groups, and so its decision-making is not strictly
hierarchical.

Policy decision-making occurs at the

executive level.

An executive group meets (twice per year)

to examine priorities for the coming year.

This group also

does strategic planning for the organization on a five-year
basis.

For program-level decision making, biannual

meetings of program directors and officers result in an
agenda for the coming fiscal year.
country-by-country level.

The same is true on a

Moreover, a disaster invites ad-

hoc planning of the sort necessary for dealing with an
unforeseen situation.

Many planning and decision-making

events occur in this manner as well.

Because of its

confederation structure, CARE will not be a case study
directly applicable to all agencies its size; nevertheless,
its evaluation systems and challenges will be relevant to
organizations engaged in similar work.
CARE International’s emergency response evaluations
will serve as the case study for these research questions.
An ODI report (Willits-King & Darcy, 2005)on agencies that
respond to complex emergencies found that CARE has a much21

deserved reputation among beneficiaries for responding
effectively to emergencies, but that the organization
invests little in emergency response by comparison to its
peers.

The report suggested that CARE is recognized for

the quality of its work in humanitarian relief, but that
the organization could commit more resources and better
utilize existing resources to scale up and increase its
capacity to respond.
The nonhierarchical structure and the multinational
scope of CARE’s work present particular challenges for
evaluation.

It is difficult to limit any evaluation in the

organization to one single unit of analysis because the
information needs of different bodies in the organization
are very different.

It can be difficult, as well, to

gather consistent data in such an organization because of
logistics and language and cultural obstacles.

Also, there

are multiple relationship dynamics that come into play when
considering the areas of influence on which evaluations
touch.

For these reasons, CARE is an intriguing case study

whose patterns of influence have implications for how
similar complex transnational organizations function.
The study draws from two main data sources. The first
of these data sources is all of the available evaluation
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reports from CARE’s emergency response activity from 20002005.

These reports range from a brief summary to a multi-

document behemoth.

CARE uses four main formats for

evaluation of emergency response efforts. 1) The Real Time
Evaluation occurs in the middle of an intervention and
assesses the success of the effort so far. 2) The After
Action Review occurs just after an intervention and is
typically a reflection session lasting three or four days
and involving the staff members, temporary and permanent,
who comprised the emergency response team.

The 3) Final

Evaluation occurs after the intervention and formally
formulates the lessons CARE hopes to take away from the
experience of the response for the future.

4) The Multi

Agency Evaluation involves the major INGOs who collaborated
to mount a response in a large-scale emergency.

These

evaluation assess not only the effectiveness of each
respective INGO, but examine the collaboration and
coordination among all of the INGOs.
The second source of data is a series of interviews
with 25 different people associated with the evaluation
process, from evaluators to field workers to management
team executives.

These individuals offer insight into

their own perceptions and experience of whether and how the
evaluations influence CARE and their practice.
23

The

interviews examine both the perspectives of those who
conduct the evaluations and the perceptions of those who
purportedly read and use the final evaluation reports.
The research draws upon Kirkhart’s (2000)Integrated
Theory of Influence, which considers evaluations using
three different gauges: Intention (intended or unintended),
Source (process or results), and Time (immediate, end-ofcycle, or long-term).

These dimensions inform the

interview questions around whether and how the evaluations
from 2000-2005 affected later practice and policy.
The central analysis for the evaluation and interview
data employs Henry and Mark’s (2003)’pathways’ of
evaluation influence as the basis for examining how an
evaluation affects an INGO from start to finish.

Like

Kirkhart, Henry and Mark find ‘use’ to be a limiting term,
and they advocate for the broader ‘influence.’

Their work

culls from social science theories to propose pathways of
influence which help to categorize the different levels at
which influence might occur: 1) the individual, 2) the
interpersonal, or 3) the collective.
Henry and Mark’s taxonomy offers a starting point for
examining one organization’s treatment of evaluations in
the emergency response arena.

The analysis will use these
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three levels of influence to track interview responses and
evaluation report data in order to observe how the report
process and findings influence various levels of
communication, if at all.
Their taxonomy proposes a sort of menu for identifying
and categorizing examples of influence.

They are drawing

from multiple disciplines, so some of their influence
categories are more likely to show up in a large,
decentralized INGO such as CARE than are others.

For

example, in the “individual” level of influence, the
“attitude change” mechanism is likely to surface in a study
of CARE because it is a mechanism that easily lends itself
to a program (as opposed to a policy).

Determining whether

an individual’s attitude shifted is entirely feasible with
interview data.

Conversely, the “salience” mechanism is

more about policy-related issues than about programs, and
so is not as likely to emerge from the CARE study.

Other

mechanisms, such as “elaboration,” are difficult to
pinpoint with interview data.

Finally, it is more likely

that the study will reveal examples of the individual-level
mechanisms and the interpersonal-level mechanisms than the
collective-level mechanisms.

This is because it is easier

and takes less time to effect change at a programmatic
level than at a policy level. Moreover, one of the five
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pre-interviewees for the study mentioned his own impression
that evaluation reports stop short of having policy-level
influence at CARE, in part because the culture of learning
there does not leave room for evaluation data in executive
team agendas.
1.5 DEFINITION OF TERMS
The following terms will be useful for understanding
this study:
INGO – international non-governmental organization.

For

the purposes of this study, the acronym ‘INGO’ describes
any internationally-operating not-for-profit organization
or agency.

Humanitarian aid – this work is distinct from development
work and the term refers to outside assistance for
communities suffering from urgent crises such as natural
disasters, conflicts, droughts, or famines.

Use and utilization – these terms will refer to the
employment of evaluation findings in decision-making.

The

review of the literature and the discussion of methodology
will further detail these and will also distinguish between
evaluation use and evaluation influence.

Lessons learned – though this term seems at times
synonymous with ‘recommendations’ in CARE’s evaluation
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reports, for the purposes of this paper it will refer to
those items identified through an evaluation that point to
room for improvement and that bear consideration in
planning for future emergencies.

1.6 DELIMITATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
This study looks specifically at CARE International’s
use of evaluation reports for its emergency response
projects. CARE, as one of the largest NGOs working in
emergency relief, is a good case for the assessment of how
evaluations influence the organization at different levels.
This study was limited by the geographic location of
the researcher.

Though CARE is a confederation whose

secretariat is based in Geneva, Switzerland, CARE USA,
based in Atlanta, GA, typically plays a somewhat larger
role than the other CARE countries in responding to
humanitarian crises.

This, combined with the fact that the

researcher is based near Atlanta, GA, means that the study
contains a disproportionate number of Atlanta-based
interviews.

In addition, the design of the study, while

in-depth enough to provide a good picture of evaluation
implementation within the humanitarian aid section of CARE,
is not broad enough to treat any other INGO with such
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depth.

The study sacrifices generalize-ability in the

interest of internal validity in treating the case of CARE.
The study will have relevance for all humanitarian aid
agencies working on an international level, but will be
limited to an in-depth study of CARE International’s
emergency response evaluations from 2000-2005.

The two-

part study includes a meta-evaluation of all evaluation
reports conducted within or on behalf of CARE for its
humanitarian aid activities from 2000-2005.

This meta-

evaluation will be coupled with interviews with 25 CARE
employees and consultants who are involved in the
evaluations whether as evaluators, as field workers, as
senior management, or as middle management.
1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY
Existing research treats the subject of evaluation
utilization thoroughly. Though much has been written
theoretically about evaluation use, utilization, and
influence, few empirical studies have attempted to track
evaluation report findings from completion to utilization.
Fewer still have looked at evaluation implementation as it
pertains to humanitarian aid agencies.

In the interest of

responding to the recent calls for greater accountability
on the part of humanitarian aid agencies, this study aims
to address the gap in the literature pertaining to their
28

implementation of evaluation findings.

Improved practice

is one of the important goals of evaluation, and improved
practice in emergency response can save lives.
1.8 RESEARCHER’S PERSPECTIVE
As a former Peace Corps volunteer, the researcher has
the tendency to suspect that INGOs, especially those of
CARE’s reach and magnitude, are inefficient, bureaucratic,
and, at times, too “corporate.”

Though she was careful to

try to lay aside any such biases in conducting interviews,
she risks unwittingly coloring her conclusions with
preconceived images.

The researcher worked with CARE as an

intern prior to conducting the research for this project,
and as such considers her relationships there to be
friendly rather than impartial. She made an effort to have
other eyes look at the research material when she thought
there was the possibility of missing something due to her
being sympathetic to CARE.
1.9 KEY ASSUMPTIONS
A major challenge for this study is isolating
different forms of influence for evaluations.

Determining

whether or not field offices have followed up on
operational recommendations, a direct, instrumental form of
influence, is straightforward; discerning whether an
evaluation affected the social fabric of the organization
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is not.

That is to say that it is one thing to identify

instances of change, but another to be able to attribute
that change to the evaluation process or findings.
Nevertheless, the exercise of identifying mechanisms of
influence is valuable because it illuminates the possible
forms that the evaluation influence might take, thus
allowing for taking steps toward developing a theory for
how evaluations work in the humanitarian aid agency
setting.
The study assumes that the designated interviewees are
indeed an adequately representative cross-section of those
who would learn directly or indirectly from an evaluation
in the organization.

It is possible that a category of

people has been left out, or that the interviews are heavy
in one area of representation and light in another.

One

way of curbing this has been having the design, monitoring
and evaluation coordinator for CARE look over the list of
interviewees for balance and representation.

Another has

been to ask the interviewees themselves whom they would
suggest talking to, and checking those contributions
against the list of interviewees.
Building theory about organizational learning is
beyond the scope of this research; the overarching goal is
to provide CARE with insights on how to make its evaluation
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process more effective for learning and to contribute to
the dialogue on how evaluation influence works.

It is

likely that the results will not generalize easily to other
aid organizations.

Dissemination of the findings of this

research to CARE will be of particular importance, as
adding another long report to CARE employees’ reading lists
would hardly send the right message about evaluation report
efficiency and effectiveness.
Evaluation has the potential to help an organization
fulfill its mission by complementing its quest for higher
quality and greater knowledge.

The challenge becomes

determining whether the good intentions for the evaluation
report’s end use come to fruition.

Exploring how

evaluation eventually influences an organization is a
practical step for an organization whose success in
responding to a crisis depends partly on its selfunderstanding of its strengths and resources.

If a better

comprehension of how evaluation influences the organization
and beyond can lead to designing evaluations that have
greater influence, personnel whose mission is to mitigate
poverty, to alleviate suffering, will be better equipped to
do so.
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CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The following review of the literature lays out the
case for the importance and relevance of looking at how
evaluation influence works in a transnational organization.
Beginning with the literature on accountability, the
chapter looks at how accountability relates to evaluation
and why heightened calls for better accountability
necessitate more utile evaluations.

A review of how the

literature on evaluation use has evolved into a dialogue
about the many nuances of evaluation influence exposes the
need for more empirical study of how influence works.

The

review then presents the two theoretical models that inform
this study. Finally, a look at the literature on learning
organizations provides a point of departure for discussion
and reflection on the relationship between the
organization’s learning culture and the influence of
evaluations within it.
The search for literature related to the question of
how evaluation reports are used or under-used in
humanitarian aid organizations revealed an impressive range
of different kinds of evaluation activities in the INGO
world as well as a spate of literature on the utilization
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of evaluation.

In addition to Google Scholar, the

researcher searched the following databases for relevant
literature: ABI/Inform, Academic Search Premier, Jstor,
PAIS, and the Web of Science.

She employed the following

terms for the search: evaluation use, evaluation
utilization, evaluation influence, evaluation and
accountability, humanitarian aid and accountability,
humanitarian aid and evaluation, evaluation and
organizational learning, INGO and learning organization.
Her intent with these last two search terms was to
ascertain whether others have studied or written about
accountability or utilization as part of or as resulting
from a culture of learning within an organization.
2.1 Accountability versus Evaluation
The terms ‘accountability’ and ‘evaluation’ are often
used interchangeably in disaster relief parlance.

There

is, however, an important distinction between the two.
Evaluation purports to add to or improve an organization’s
accountability.

This makes accountability an important

piece of the discussion on the influence of evaluation in
humanitarian relief, as recent years have seen increased
attention to the importance of accountability in such
agencies as media and public scrutiny of them rises.
Accountability usually refers to documenting how donor
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funds were spent or, in the case of government dollars,
being accountable to taxpayers for the use of their tax
money.

Accountability is larger than budget records and is

also a statement of who is responsible for what or who is
in control (I. Smillie, and Larry Minear, 2004).
Evaluation, on the other hand, subsumes
accountability; in fact, the best-known set of standards
for program evaluation in the United States is that of the
Joint Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation
(The Program Evaluation Standards, 1994).

These standards

aim to guide process and outcome evaluations of programs.
The standards fall under four headings: utility,
feasibility, propriety, and accuracy.
in the propriety category.

Accountability falls

Mark, Henry, and Julnes (2000)

list accountability (their term is ‘compliance and
oversight’ as one of four main purposes of evaluation.
This is germane to this study because if evaluations are
likely to be initiated within the INGO because of increased
concern for greater accountability, the question arises as
to whether they can also be used to greater effect in other
ways. Ebrahim (2003a)distinguishes between internal and
external accountability within NGOs. External
accountability refers to how the INGO answers to donors.
Internal accountability is the agency’s responsibility to
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itself to perform well.

Alistair Hallam (1998)insists that

evaluations of complex emergencies should stress either
accountability or lesson-learning, and if they stress
lesson-learning, they ought to be participatory.

Donahue

and Tuohy (2007)contend that in disaster response,
“lessons-learned” is a ‘misnomer.’

Their exploratory study

concludes that, in fact, lessons are too often not learned.
Donahue and Tuohy, through a series of focus group
interviews, found that even if lessons are identified, an
organization often has few systems in place for
institutionalizing the learning.
Kirkby et al. list accountability, knowledge, and
development as three perspectives on disaster evaluation
(Kirkby, Howorth, Keefe, & Collins, 2001).

They emphasize

that evaluations have purpose, notably knowledge increase,
beyond accounting to donors.

They mention the value of

inter-agency evaluation for enhanced learning; the Joint
Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, they observe,
has become a benchmark of sorts for this kind of interorganizational learning.

Smillie (1997), in discussing

accountability within an examination on what it means for
an INGO to be ‘transparent,’ asks, “greater than what?” as
in, NGOs are always called to greater transparency. But
greater than what? The accountability question is the same:
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NGOs are called to be more accountable. But more
accountable than whom?

Organizations such as HAP are

answering that question with a set of standards for NGOs to
use as a reference point.

It is clear that there is

attention in the literature to establishing a minimum
standard of accountability. This begs the question of
whether there is a limit to how much effort an organization
should put into striving for greater accountability.

There

is a question of whether there a point at which the costs
of evaluating exceed the benefits to the organization of
the evaluation outcomes. Of course, it seems lofty and
ideal for an organization to strive for ever-greater
transparency and accountability. But nonprofits by
definition are working with limited resources, and at some
point spending resources on accountability practices takes
resources away from the programs themselves.
2.2 Utility of evaluation
Though accountability receives a great deal of
attention as a main purpose of post-crisis evaluation,
utility of the evaluation is of particular importance for
assessing response to conflict or disaster situations.
There are a number of different ‘uses’ identified
throughout the literature, from a distinction between
‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ use (Scriven, 1991),to a
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categorization of use as conceptual; symbolic;
enlightenment; imposed (Weiss, Murphy-Graham, & Birkeland,
2005).‘Intended use’ of an evaluation is always a
significant consideration, but in an emergency, planning
for response can be ad-hoc in nature and can tend to draw
from available, rather than optimal, resources.
Consequently, organizational processing of positive and
negative lessons learned from disaster response can be of
particular value for anticipating and preparing for future
crises.

This research will employ Karen Kirkhart’s (2000)

“re-conceptualized” theory of use to examine the
characteristics of emergency response evaluations along
axes of source, intent, and time, as a step toward
understanding the evaluation report contents and where
those report contents might hold influence. That report
data informs the coding of the interview data, for which
Henry and Mark’s (2003) framework provides the basis.
Current thinking on evaluation use stems from a body
of work on knowledge and research utilization that sprang
from a governmental focus on social betterment in the 1960s
and 1970s.

Lyndon B Johnson’s War on Poverty brought with

it an increased spending, not just on social programs, but
also on social science research to inform the poverty
battle.

With the onslaught of social science research came
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a heightened concern for accountability, and it is out of
this period that program evaluation became an established
area of practice.

Technology transfer, also, emerged as a

critical research area, with obvious implications for how
the research was disseminated.
That research theoretically results in new knowledge
was not a novel concept during this period of establishing
program evaluation; of greater concern was how
practitioners utilized that knowledge.

Social science

research provided a means of identifying cause-and-effect
relationships between programming and results, which was of
keen interest to decision-makers (Weiss, 1977).
Nevertheless, the factors contributing to effective
utilization of research remained to be identified.

Much of

the scholarly thinking during this period looked at the use
of research on a national or policy level; the
organizational level was still to come.

This attention to

accountability did not extend to NGOs during this time.
NGOs received relatively little public and private funding
(and thus little pressure to measure the impact they were
having) until the 1980s (Edwards & Hulme, 1996).

The 1990s

brought still another increase in funding, and a tandem
focus on accountability.
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The 1980s saw a shift in scholarship toward attempting
deliberately to predict or to influence evaluation use.
The need to distinguish between different kinds of use
became apparent.

Carol Weiss (1977) introduced

instrumental use as a term for the classic linear form of
use, or the use, perhaps, that the researcher intended: the
researcher or evaluator proffers knowledge directly to the
user, who in turn uses it immediately and as the researcher
envisioned.

Conceptual use, for Weiss, is less direct and

occurs when a piece of knowledge influences an individual’s
thinking about a policy or program.

Finally, symbolic use

occurs when decision-makers use research knowledge for
political gain or to justify already-made decisions.
Though scholars were distinguishing between different kinds
of use at this point, many programs -- including INGO
development and relief programs -- were not.

ALNAP, formed

in 1997, raised the dialogue about evaluation use in the
humanitarian assistance world by providing a forum for
“lessons learned” jointly and individually.

Only in its

most recent (Sandison, 2006)research is ALNAP including
different kinds of use in its scope.
In the late 1980s, a large contribution to the
thinking on evaluation use came in the form of the WeissPatton debate (M. Q. Patton, 1988; Shulha & Cousins, 1997;
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Smith, 1989; Weiss, 1988; Weiss, 1998). Weiss, as a keynote
speaker at the annual meeting of the American Evaluation
Association in Boston in 1987, made remarks concerning the
role of evaluators in determining the ultimate use of
evaluation research.

She contended that the information

resulting from evaluations is not the only factor that
influences decision-making; there are political, even nonrational, characteristics of decision-making contexts that
affect how evaluation information is received.

Evaluators,

then, should focus on good evaluation design and good data.
Patton took Weiss to task for this, asserting the primary
responsibility of evaluators to those who will ultimately
use the evaluation results.

His concept of use starts with

the evaluator journeying with the stakeholders and helping
them identify what they need from the evaluation.

The

evaluation report, then, will be useful if it provides
information that meets those needs.

Smith (Smith,

1989)pointed out that both Weiss and Patton contribute
important ideas to the concept of use, but that the program
context is critical to determining who the stakeholders are
and how they can or will use evaluation information.
Weiss, in addressing the American Evaluation Association
again a decade later (Weiss, 1998), acknowledged that she
and Patton, in fact, agreed on a number of points,
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particularly at the program level.

She went on to discuss

emerging understandings of what it is that is used.

She

asserted that use is no longer just about evaluation
findings, but extends to influence on other organizations
and institutions.

This debate paralleled attempts at joint

evaluations on the part of humanitarian relief agencies
responding to disasters.

Multilateral donors, NGOs, and

consultants comprised the team of evaluators for a largescale joint evaluation of the response to the Rwanda
genocide in 1994(Wood, 2001).

This well-publicized effort

showed the importance of context to program effectiveness
and revealed the importance of considering the effects of
the evaluation findings on multiple agencies and
institutions.

It is not uncommon to explain the

inefficiency in using evaluation findings on the political
nature of large organizations (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002).
In more recent research dialogue, the concept of
“process use” has introduced the idea that the very process
of evaluating is itself a form of use: an interview can be
a type of intervention, data gathering can increase interorganizational communication, and the evaluator’s
interaction with stakeholders can provide them with an
opportunity for reflection (Shulha & Cousins, 1997).

The

idea of process use expanded beyond the individual’s use to
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include organizational learning.

Patton’s (2002)appealing

“intended use by intended users” hearkens to the notion
that on some level, use ought to be deliberate.

His

philosophy that end users who are invested in the
evaluation process itself will use the resulting
information fruitfully makes the important point that
programs are fundamentally made up of human beings, and
their involvement has to matter.

For some kinds of

evaluation, such as empowerment evaluation, the people are
the only thing that matter in terms of use, as long as they
emerge from the evaluation with the capacity to evaluate
themselves (Fetterman 2001).
Patton’s ‘utilization-focused’ evaluation is optimal
for ensuring impact on some level.

It does not address

unintended impact or so called “symbolic use” (Beyer &
Trice, 1982).

This is not a shortcoming; it is simply to

say that Patton’s approach is not necessarily the ideal
model for all evaluation occasions.

He does intimate that

‘process use’ can facilitate communication (Shulha &
Cousins, 1997), a notion echoed by Shulock(2000), who
mentions it as a means of ‘framing political discourse.’
Patton’s stance, however, is relevant to some contexts, and
not to others; when an evaluation is outcome-oriented, for
example, is large-scale, and is not concerned with process
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questions, the ‘intended users’ become hard to work with
very personally.
Shulock’s concept of use, adding to the language in
order to further facilitate discussion of new or revisited
knowledge, highlights the importance of reporting results
with an eye toward framing future decision-making dialogue.
Her argument is further reinforced with her empirical test
of her ideas; empirical testing of use is not commonplace
and has much potential for demonstrating how one might
integrate good theory of use into practice.
The study of evaluation use in an organizational
setting led to greater questions about organizational
learning and knowledge management.

Evaluation utilization

relates to the organizational learning environment.

This

is particularly true if, as Patton (1994) suggests, the
process of evaluating is the learning environment.

This

idea of process as a valuable forum independent of a
“findings” report is only very recently visible in the
humanitarian aid world.

There is an emerging distinction –

most identifiable in ALNAP’s evaluative reports database -between mid-crisis evaluations, final syntheses, and postresponse reviews, which are more about reflection on the
part of the response team than about impact measurement.
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Conner (1998) posits that in order to progress in our
thinking about evaluation use, we must take a different,
more macroscopic view; Kirkhart(2000)asserts that language
is important when theorizing about evaluation, and that
“use” is not a sufficiently precise term for describing the
way that organizations employ evaluation findings. She
suggests the more expansive “influence,” which she contends
more accurately captures “…effects that are
multidirectional, incremental, un-intentional, and noninstrumental, alongside those that are unidirectional,
episodic, intended, and instrumental.”

Her Integrated

Theory of Influence considers evaluations using three
different gauges: Intention (intended or unintended, Source
(process or results), and Time (immediate, end-of-cycle, or
long-term.
The first of her dimensions, source of influence,
refers to the point at which -- or as a result of which -the evaluation effects change. This may be at the process
level or at the results level. The process level comes from
Patton’s (1998)(1998) notion of “process use,” that is, use
that stems from the exercise of evaluating. The idea is
that involvement in the steps of evaluating can affect an
individual or organization in ways distinct from how the
ultimate findings of the evaluation might.
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For the

purposes of this study, the logic model for CARE’s
emergency response evaluations includes both the process
and the results categories for source of influence: indeed,
one format of evaluation in particular (the After Action
Review) for CARE lends itself to a “process” source of
influence.
Kirkhart’s second dimension in her theory of influence
is intention. Intention in her model is a description of
whether and how the result of an evaluation is targeted or
purposeful.

She distinguishes between manifest intended

influence and latent intended influence, that is,
articulated influence such as program improvement, and
unstated intention such as building a program’s
credibility. “Unintended” influence is simply that which
those conducting or commissioning the evaluation did not
anticipate.
The third element of Kirkhart’s framework is time,
which she categorizes as immediate, end-of-cycle, or longterm. Acknowledging that these are arbitrary categories,
she nevertheless points out that just as programs evolve at
different points in their life cycle, so does the potential
influence of evaluation results on the program. Her “time”
dimension also considers whether an instance of influence
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occurs at a single moment in time as opposed to a change
process woven through the time period.
Kirkhart’s thinking on evaluation influence marked an
acknowledgement in the literature that ‘use’ and
‘utilization’ are problematic terms for capturing the
entirety of the panoply of possible consequences of
evaluation results. Henry and Mark(2003)also prefer the
broader ‘influence,’ and offer a framework for representing
how evaluation effects various sorts of changes and
ultimately leads to ‘social betterment.’

Their distinction

of levels of influence as being between intra- and interpersonal change processes brings up a consideration absent
from Kirkhart’s three dimensions of source, intention, and
time: influence can occur at the level of the individual or
at the level of more than one interacting individual. Henry
and Mark centrally argue that any evaluation has
anticipated outcomes and that mapping influence through the
individual, interpersonal, and collective levels can trace
change all the way from the evaluation to the policy level.
Henry and Mark’s taxonomy, drawing from several bodies
of literature in social science disciplines, categorizes
evaluation influence into three levels, each of which has
several change processes representing what evaluation
influence could look like in any given context.
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Their

levels of influence offer a sort of “menu” from which the
evaluator or the researcher may select in order to cater a
theory of influence to a particular situation.

This figure

depicts how their levels of influence break down into
levels and “menu” items1:

Figure 1: Mechanisms Through Which Evaluation Produces
Influences

The individual level concerns change brought about in
a single person as a result of participating in an
evaluation or reading the findings in an evaluation report.
The types of influence for the individual level range from
1

From Henry, G.T., and Mark, M.M. (2003). Beyond Use:
Understanding Evaluation’s Influence on Attitudes and
Actions. Sage: American Journal of Evaluation 24.
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attitude change about an issue or program to actual
behavioral change.

The interpersonal level addresses types

of influence occurring between two or more persons, as when
one person uses an evaluation’s findings to persuade
another of his position.

The collective level looks at

change brought about at the organizational or interorganizational level, as when an evaluation’s findings
diffuse to another setting and foster change there.
Henry and Mark’s framework proposes a potentially
useful tool for categorizing forms of evaluation influence,
for tracing “pathways” of influence, and eventually for
designing evaluations to have greater positive influence.
Very few studies have applied the Henry and Mark framework
to a particular case; Weiss et al. (2005) found that Henry
and Mark’s (2003) framework fit their data well. The
results of their study of the effectiveness of the
evaluations of the D.A.R.E. program corroborate Henry and
Mark’s (2003; Mark & Henry, 2004) three change process
levels. Their study is particularly interesting because
they looked at evaluations of a program widely and publicly
considered to be a failure. It would be easy to argue that
the evaluations of DARE were irrelevant given the
prevailing attitude about the merit of the program.
However, Weiss et al.’s application of the Henry and Mark
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framework finds that the framework fits the DARE evaluation
experience. That the Henry and Mark general framework
adapts to fit a local context suggests that evaluation
influence is, in itself, a viable concept, and that
evaluation itself can cause change in even cause multilevel positive change even in a failed program.

The

authors also identify a new concept of use – imposed use –
where (federal) donors may dictate what an agency does with
its evaluation results in order to continue to be funded.
This may be relevant to the case at hand; Weiss et al.
speculate that a ‘results’ orientation will foster imposed
use, and CARE professes itself to be results-oriented.
Kirkhart and Mark and Henry make good cases for the
potential applications of a sound theory of influence
adaptable to a given context. Both offer dimensions
(Kirkhart’s term) that might undergird such a model of
influence. Other possibilities for dimensions show up in
the literature. Almeida and Báscolo (2006), in their review
of the literature on use of research results in decisionmaking, present the interaction between the researchers and
the decision-makers as a potential root of knowledge
transfer. This could be a subset of Kirkhart’s source of
influence dimension.

Leviton (2003)finds both the Kirkhart

model and the Mark and Henry framework to be practitioner49

friendly distillations of theoretical advances on the topic
of evaluation use, though she suggests that there is even
still a need to consider context and user knowledge
construction.

Leviton’s supposition is particularly

relevant to the CARE example because there are several
different learning and operating contexts within the same
organization, all of which draw from the same evaluation
reports.
Ginsberg and Rhett(2003)look at a series of education
evaluations in an attempt to pinpoint where evaluations
have influenced legislation and policymaking. Though the
thrust of their work is to make a case for scientifically
rigorous methodology in response to increasing call for
good evidence in the policy arena, they also convincingly
observe that not all good questions are causal and that
sound methodology can address implementation, not just
cause.

Their work is an important example of how

evaluation influence at a policy level can be traced back
to the evaluation itself.

A large organization could,

perhaps, trace evaluation influence to determine whether
the evaluation reports have any influence on organizational
policy.
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2.3 LEARNING ORGANIZATIONS
Examining the influence of evaluation on a large
humanitarian relief agency would not be complete without
considering the organization’s internal culture of
learning.

The employees’ perception of the culture of

learning also surely has an effect on their attitude toward
the utility of evaluation.

The body of literature on

organizational learning is vast and spans decades.

Argyris

and Schon’s seminal work on organizational learning
(Argyris & Schon, 1978; 1996)fleshes out the seeming
paradox embedded in the concept: individual people learn,
retain information, transfer information, and so forth, so
how can an organization be said to “learn”? What and how
does it learn? They get around this paradox by examining
what it is to be an “organization.”

An organization has

procedures and boundaries, and significantly, it designates
individuals to make decisions for the whole.

If

individuals can act on behalf of an organization, then they
can learn on behalf of an organization (Argyris & Schön,
1996).

They distinguish between different types of

learning: single-loop learning changes either individual
assumptions behind organizational strategy, or changes the
organization’s strategy.

Double-loop learning, on the

other hand, changes values in addition to strategies and
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assumptions.

This distinction suggests that there are

different levels of learning and that each level depends
greatly on the learning environment.
Peter Senge (1992)brought the term “learning
organization” into mainstream usage and offered the
characteristics of such an organization.

Senge named

five “disciplines” of a learning organization: 1) personal
mastery of individual vision and of objective reality; 2)
mental models, or assumptions affecting how we see the
world; 3) building a shared vision of the future; 4) team
learning and dialogue, and 5) systems thinking, or being
able to “see the organization’s patterns as a whole…from
within the organization.”

This fifth discipline

incorporates the other four and is critical to the
organization’s evolving as a learning organization with a
learning culture.

For Senge, managers must learn to

strategize, not merely within the scope of their own
responsibilities, but about the whole system and in the
long term.
Organizational culture may be the single greatest factor
in how an organization learns.

It is difficult to pinpoint

the characteristics of an organizational culture.
Certainly, beliefs, values, and norms about performance
management are likely to comprise a portion of the
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organizational culture, especially for larger
organizations.

Sackmann (1992) turns to the concept of

sense-making to explain what is at the heart of an
organizational culture:

Individuals make sense of what

they experience through cognition.

Cognitive aids might

include labeling things or events, attaching causes to
events, or developing lessons learned to take away from
events.

When these cognitive aids are common to a group,

they comprise some of the collective knowledge that guides
the behavior and thinking of the group. Sackmann
distinguished between four types of cultural knowledge.
Dictionary knowledge takes the form of definitions and
labels. Directory knowledge identifies cause and effect
relationships and establishes how things happen or are
done.

Recipe knowledge describes the cause-and-effect

relationships of possible events, or how things should be
done.

Finally, axiomatic knowledge involves core beliefs,

or the “why” behind how things are done.

These

distinctions of culture and knowledge are relevant to the
case of CARE because the organization is so layered and
complex that those who receive evaluation reports and are
expected act on the findings and recommendations may have
information and knowledge needs that are worlds apart.
consideration of what information looks like for the
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A

respective audiences could make the difference in how CARE
makes use of the information.
1.4 PRIOR RESEARCH
Humanitarian aid organizations have characteristics that
distinguish them from corporations and from other
nonprofits in terms of learning environment.

Working in a

developing country often means confronting an
unpredictable, chaotic setting with little infrastructure.
Moreover, cultures and levels of development can differ so
much from one to another that it appears impossible simply
to apply a program to one place just because it worked in
another (Berg, 2000).

Humanitarian aid organizations often

have country-level offices as well as headquarters with
divisions across sectors.

Each of these layers has a

structure based on the competencies and responsibilities of
the individual employees.

This can encumber learning.

Research on learning in humanitarian aid organizations
is as varied as are the organizations themselves.

Agencies

can be local, working uniquely on emergencies and only in
one country.

They can be large, as is the case with CARE

and its contemporaries such as Oxfam and World Vision.
These organizations often work in other areas in addition
to emergencies and work in several regions in the world.
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There are also governmental organizations and international
organizations such as the United Nations.
One study of the UNHCR looked at the UNHCR response to
two different crises: the 1991 conflict in northern Iraq,
which followed the gulf war, and the Kosovo refugee
situation of 1999.

The objective of the study was to

determine whether any improvements in the UNHCR’s response
in Kosovo resulted from “lessons-learned” in the Iraq
evaluation.

The basic finding was that improvements in

response did result from the evaluation lessons-learned,
but that some recommendations were easier to incorporate
than others.

For example, recommendations regarding a

simple technical operation were easy to implement, whereas
recommendations about early warning, which depends on
political and external factors, were not.
Another study, of the International Institute for
Educational Planning, attempted to answer the question of
whether learning takes place primarily through studying the
organization’s training and capacity-building programs.

In

another case, ALNAP published a volume of case studies of
humanitarian aid agency evaluations (Wood, 2001).

Two of

the case studies address practitioners’ reflections on the
follow-up of evaluation recommendations and lessonslearned.

One found that designating a formal follow-up
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person or team assured that the recommendations would be
revisited (Wood, 2001).

The other also recommended a

formal follow-up structure, and further remarked that the
timing of the evaluation report affected whether it was
incorporated into planned decision-making meetings.

While

these studies offer useful insights on which
recommendations lend themselves to implementation or how to
enhance the process of evaluating, they do not consider
evaluation use beyond that which is direct and
instrumental.
It is difficult to address evaluation utilization
without also considering how or whether an organization
learns or has a culture of learning.

Ramalingam (2005), in

designing a study of several international development
agencies, asks: “how does the organization measure the
costs and benefits of learning or of not learning? How have
systems of monitoring and evaluation been used to map these
costs?” Indeed, it is hard to divorce evaluation from an
organization’s style of learning.

This also brings up the

question of whether learning is necessarily a priority for
NGOs.

Evaluation is already an accountability tool, and

NGOs are more flush than ever with aid money.

There is a

question of whether learning in and of itself is an
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important enough goal to justify the time and expense of
evaluation.
Taut and Alkin (2002) look at program staff
impressions of what impedes evaluation implementation.
Their study tests whether factors identified by Alkin
(1985)as impediments to utilization are the same factors
that impinge on effective evaluation implementation.

Their

study of the UCLA Outreach Staff concluded that, indeed,
the barriers to evaluation implementation mimic those of
evaluation utilization.

Taut and Alkin suggest that the

attitudes and perceptions of the members of an organization
greatly affect how and whether the evaluation is conducted.
Forss, Cracknell, and Samset (1994)also found that the
involvement of organization members in the evaluation
process will often spur organizational learning.
The recent literature on humanitarian aid reveals that
there is an increasing interest on the part of donors,
governments, and the public at large in greater INGO
accountability.

The scandals in the 1990s exposed the

dubious practices of prominent NGOs and undermined the
public’s trust (Gibelman & Gelman, 2001).

The intense

media scrutiny of these events resulted in an international
community suddenly attentive to INGO efficiency and
effectiveness. It amounted to a clarion call for NGOs to
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hold themselves accountable to a respectable degree of
rigor. Ebrahim (2003a) points out that NGOs had theretofore
been assumed to have been effective at serving the world’s
poor, and now must concretely consider how to integrate
accountability into their operations.
A cornerstone of an organization’s internal system of
accountability is its monitoring and evaluation activities.
The sequitur from that, beyond merely determining if the
organization can adequately and justly account for its
actions, is the question of whether and how the
organization then uses its evaluations to make positive
changes in its practice.

Also, the organization may go so

far as to employ evaluation findings to better its practice
on the ground, but what of the policies that govern the
organization as a whole? Ginsberg and Rhett’s
(2003)experience suggests that evaluations appropriately
timed and sufficiently scientific can affect legislative
decisions in congress.

This leads one to wonder whether

evaluations can have a similar pattern of influence within
a large-scale organization: is there a policy level of
influence distinct from the program level of influence for
evaluation results, and are the indicators for success
different at the policy level?

58

SUMMARY
The body of literature on evaluation utilization is
substantial, spanning nearly three decades.

Much of it

focuses on instrumental use, that is, the direct link
between research and knowledge transfer.

Shulha and

Cousins (1997) and others have observed that context is
critical to understanding and studying evaluation use.

Use

is itself an overused and vague term; influence ((Henry &
Mark, 2003; Kirkhart, 2000; Weiss et al., 2005) better
captures the panoply of impacts an evaluation may have on
an organization.

Weiss makes the clearest connection

between the call for greater accountability and the
(imposed) use of the evaluation results.

Though her

conclusions draw from an American example of a governmentfunded public program, her observation that a donor’s
scrutiny of accountability practices can lead to an
imposition of how evaluation results are employed going
forward is relevant for any sort of agency receiving some
public funding.
If dialoguing in terms of evaluation influence, rather
than in terms of evaluation use, more accurately reflects
how evaluation is a tool for nonprofits to make the world
better, the question becomes what exactly “influence” looks
like. Kirkhart attempts to answer that question with her
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integrated theory, providing a generalist framework
depicting influence as a function of time, source of
influence, and intent, with subcategories within those.
Mark and Henry, also, frame influence, projecting it in
levels of communication or interaction.

Both of these

frameworks, in theory, can adapt to a specific context.
This paper will use Kirkhart’s framework to develop a
context-specific map of CARE’s emergency response
evaluation influence, informed by Mark and Henry’s
interpersonal categories.

Mark and Henry’s model will

serve as a springboard for developing a theoretical
framework for evaluation in the humanitarian assistance and
emergency response context. Kirkhart’s model serves as a
point of departure for a discussion on evaluation influence
writ large; Henry and Mark’s framework helps to ascertain
whether evaluations go beyond accountability and what
factors lead them to do so.
The media frenzy over the scandal-riddled 1990s for
NGOs appropriately coincided with emerging scholarship on
evaluation influence.

Though it is established that there

is desire on the part of donors, governments, and the
public for greater and more consistent INGO accountability,
a larger question remains as to whether the INGO’s holding
itself more accountable in fact improves on its practice
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and furthers its mission. There is a dearth of study on
just how NGOs account for their actions and, more
importantly, whether their accountability efforts lead to
better practice and positive societal change. This study
looks at both accountability and evaluation influence in
the specific context of CARE’s emergency response
activities.
The literature supports the theory that there is great
interest in INGO accountability and a need for structures
that support that as well as better understanding of what
it looks like. The evaluation literature shows a
progression of thinking on evaluation utilization, with
current attention to how to study evaluation influence.
But the “so what?” question is whether established
accountability systems on the part of the INGO results in
better practice and ultimately in the NGOs improving on
fulfilling their mission.

It is also possible that

evaluations influence the organization and beyond in ways,
intended or unintended, that transcend the traditional and
tangible notion of direct, instrumental use. These lessobservable forms of influence may represent valuable ways
in which evaluations affect individuals, the organization,
or the broader INGO community, whether through
participation in the evaluation process or through exposure
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to evaluation findings in a report. This study contributes
an empirical approach to tracing “pathways” of influence in
a large, transnational organization to the literature on
evaluation influence and on NGOs.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
As previously stated, this study aims to examine how
humanitarian aid evaluation reports, and the process of
conducting them, influence the aid agency’s policies and
practice.

By applying Henry and Mark’s mechanisms for

influencing to the case of CARE’s humanitarian relief work,
the study identifies factors that lead (or do not lead) to
the application of the evaluation findings and also
investigates unintended ways in which the evaluations
affect the organization.

This study is important because

the effectiveness of disaster relief is important for
millions of people who are the victims of disaster and
evaluation provides one of the best ways for improving
policies and practices that can in turn improve the
outcomes for those affected by disasters. A deeper
understanding of how and why evaluation reports effectively
inform and improve practice (or why they do not) can help
NGOs to operate more efficiently and with greater
accountability to their donors and to their beneficiaries.
Evaluation recommendations can improve practice by showing
an agency where to change ineffective practice and when to
replicate things done well. It is certainly the hope that
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evaluations facilitate an agency’s being accountable to its
donors, beneficiaries, and the public. But it may also be
the case that evaluations have a valuable role beyond that
for improving policy and practice.

Theories of and Frameworks for Influence
The research specifically looks at how and whether
evaluations influence humanitarian aid organizations and
the environment in which they operate. Evaluations also
affect this environment.

Ultimately, the research probes

whether this call for increased accountability on the part
of NGOs does in fact lead to a positive difference in how
they practice.

To do this, Kirkhart’s Integrated Theory

of Influence will serve as an initial frame for sorting out
the ways in which ‘influence’ differs from ‘use’ in
describing what sort of impact an evaluation may have for
humanitarian relief.

An earlier version of this study

proposed to use Kirkhart’s theory to describe the patterns
of influence at CARE; however, her theory proved difficult
to operationalize for this purpose.

Her theory is entirely

relevant to the discussion on influence versus use and to
the broader conversation about the need for useful and
accurate theories and models of influence.
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Her theory is

used here merely to help shape the final analysis by
providing points of discussion for what influence looks
like in practice
For the specific case of CARE, Henry and Mark’s
Pathways of Influence serve as the guide for identifying
what evaluation influence looks like within CARE’s
emergency assistance practice. Their framework provides a
sort of menu of possible mechanisms through which
evaluations may influence an agency and the broader policy
community in which it functions.

This study will consider

each of the menu items for their relevance and
applicability to the context of the large transnational
humanitarian aid agency. Henry and Mark maintain that
culling from social science research yields ‘pathways’
which help to shed light on the various forms evaluation
influence can take.

They limit their discussion of

evaluation influence to that influence which is relevant to
‘social betterment,’ an important narrowing of scope given
vast number of ways in which ‘influence’ might manifest
itself.

Henry and Mark’s work is particularly germane to

the humanitarian assistance INGO because responding
responsibly to emergencies is by its nature a gesture
toward social betterment.

Since they are likely to conduct

the evaluations for accountability reasons alone, such
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organizations stand to benefit a great deal from better
understanding how their evaluations influence their
policies and programs. Further cultivating the aspects of
their evaluation process which favor eventual program and
policy improvement would amount to better furthering their
humanitarian missions.
To identify factors leading to the effective
utilization of evaluation processes and reports in
humanitarian relief agencies, CARE International’s
emergency response division serves as an extensive case
study of evaluation impact.

CARE is a significant case

because it is a major deliverer of relief and has a high
profile for this type of work.

Because of its non-

hierarchical organizational structure and its presence in
multiple locations, it does not mirror the structure of
other INGOs, and it is in a way a series of cases within
one. That is, CARE is so decentralized that the regional
and country offices act with great autonomy and, therefore,
are somewhat independent in the extent to which they are
influenced by evaluation.

It is nevertheless a good case

to study for these questions, as it is a central player in
the humanitarian assistance world, and because looking at
several layers within the one organization offers a good
opportunity for discovering instances of influence at more
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than one level.

There are other similarly de centralized

INGOs (e.g. Oxfam) who presumably would have similar
evaluation challenges and patterns.

Within the multi-

tiered organization, there are sometimes simultaneous
relief efforts occurring.

The professional staff brings a

wealth of expertise to its emergency response efforts, from
procurement experts to security personnel to advocacy
representatives to evaluators.

In contrast to many of its

peers, the organization has commissioned thorough
evaluations for each and every one of its emergency
response activities for the past seven years, with the
larger-scale relief efforts evaluated more than once in
different formats.

This offers a host of evaluation

reports for study and comparison.

3.2 Rationale for Qualitative Design
This study employs a qualitative design.

The research

is based on (1) a series of interviews of individuals who
conduct the evaluations or receive/theoretically use the
evaluation findings as well as (2) a content analysis of
current evaluation reports.

Though a quantitative approach

would also be possible for this research, such as through a
quantitatively-analyzed written survey of those who conduct
and receive evaluation reports in the organization, the
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choice of a qualitative design is appropriate given the
lack of theory in the field.

Moreover, while there is a

great deal of research on evaluation utilization, very
little of it looks at evaluation use using a specific
organization or agency as a case, and none of it looks at
the international humanitarian assistance context.
The great advantage to using the CARE case to look at
evaluation influence is that CARE has a similar approach to
emergency response wherever it works, regardless of the
type of emergency or the geographical location of the
emergency. Some of the same personnel deploy to emergencies
in very different contexts.

Moreover, the evaluations of

each of CARE’s emergency response efforts are similarly
formatted, with evaluators often involved in assessing more
than one emergency.

All of this overlap helps to assure

that, though the emergencies can vary greatly in terms of
type of emergency, scale and setting, there are constants
such as the response and evaluation formats that make them
comparable within CARE.
This context also means that evaluators are working in
a variety of settings, from natural disasters to conflict
situations to famines and droughts. The evaluators are
preparing reports that have to meet the needs of several
audiences, such as for executives or administrators who do
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not frequent the field.

Consequently, the perception of an

evaluation report’s utility could vary according to the
station or the needs of the individual receiving the
report. This difference in perception of quality is far
easier to capture in an interview than in a survey or
similarly impersonal instrument.
3.3 Research Purpose
The purpose of this research is to identify what
factors, if any, enhance or reduce the influence of
evaluation processes and reports on practices, programs and
policies within a large INGO. The study examines the
process leading up to completion of the evaluation report
for its contribution to the influence the evaluation has as
a whole on the organization.

The research will capture the

perspectives of the evaluator, the decision-maker who could
call for changes based on evaluation reports, and the
implementer who would make those changes out in the field.
The research can inform CARE, but could be relevant to any
INGO working in the humanitarian assistance arena.

It

should also have relevance for nonprofits in general in
that it helps to develop a theory of influence within a
specific organization in a particular context.

This study

has been developed to enhance our understanding of the ways
in which evaluations influence humanitarian aid agencies.
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The study endeavors to contribute to the development of
theory about evaluation influence.

Presently, the theories

about how evaluation influence works have been laid out,
notably by Kirkhart and more thoroughly by Henry and Mark,
but little testing has been done on the existing theories
so as to confirm or refine them.

This study represents one

effort to do so.
3.4 Research Questions
This research proposes to address two main questions:
A. Do evaluations of INGOs’ disaster relief activities
go beyond accountability to affect INGOs’ practice?
B. If evaluations of disaster relief activities do
improve subsequent projects, what elements of the
evaluation process or report contribute to the
evaluation’s influence on programs and policies?

With these questions serving as an overarching guide, the
research applies Henry and Mark’s Pathways of Influence to
the emergency response context.

The framework provides a

template for “mapping” the patterns of influence at CARE,
steering the discussion toward possible explanations of
whether, why and how influence did or did not occur.
Though the study looks at all evaluation reports on
humanitarian activity that CARE completed between 2000 and
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2005, it examines the example of Tropical Storm Jeanne in
greater depth.

The reason for highlighting this study is

that it provides an example of two different evaluation
approaches: an after-action review and a final evaluation.
Moreover, in the five preliminary exploratory interviews
preceding this study, more than one CARE employee touted
Tropical Storm Jeanne as an example of an influential
evaluation.
The research draws primarily from two sources of data:
I.

CARE has its own repository of evaluation reports
from emergency response evaluations conducted over
the past five years.

A meta-analysis tool (see

Appendix) identifies the characteristics of these
evaluations.

The meta-analysis checklist will help

in discerning the patterns in the lessons-learned
and evaluation findings that should theoretically be
feeding back into the organization’s programming and
policy-making.

II.

A stakeholder analysis will be the basis for the
second source of data, a series of interviews with
CARE personnel.

These interviews target a

representative group of persons at various levels of
the organization’s emergency relief programming.
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Interviews focus on evaluation report terms of
reference, dissemination, format, timing, and end
use.

For the first exercise, the study will look at all
of CARE’s evaluation reports from its emergency response
from 2000-2005.

The different categories of evaluations

are as follows:
A. Final Evaluation (FE). These long, thorough papers
were generated from evaluations conducted after an
intervention has concluded.
B. After Action Review (AAR). Also called LessonsLearned Workshops, these evaluations are typically
reflection sessions taking place shortly after an
intervention and including many or all of the staff
involved in the intervention.

The reports stemming

from AARs are typically shorter than those of final
evaluations, and can be in worksheet form as small
groups reflect on their experiences.
C. Real Time Evaluations (RTE). These assessments take
place during an intervention and are meant to take
stock of progress toward project goals.
D. Multi Agency Evaluations (MAE).

These involve

several prominent agencies assessing their joint
72

level of effectiveness in responding to a largescale emergency, i.e. the Asian tsunami.
A meta-analysis of these evaluations, using
Kirkhart’s Integrated Theory of Influence as a guiding
structure, informed the interviews for the study employing
Henry and Mark’s Pathways of Influence. Her theory,
stemming from the notion that influence is a broader and
more accurate term than use for the many direct and
indirect consequences of evaluation, names three dimensions
of influence that target both the impact of evaluation
findings and the unintended results of the evaluation
process.

To map how and whether influence occurs or is

perceived to occur within CARE, the research analyzes the
meta-evaluation data and the interview data through the
lens of Kirkhart’s Integrated Theory of Influence framework
and its three dimensions.
The first dimension, the source of influence, targets
the evaluation characteristic that is the foundation for
the evaluation’s influence in the organization.

The two

data sources provide material for identifying which
evaluation findings (if any) are being utilized and why.
Both the process of evaluating and the corresponding
results are the potential sources of influence.

The second

dimension, the intention, looks at the systems (or lack
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thereof) in place in the organization for affecting the
utilization of evaluation lessons-learned.

It also

attempts to identify any unintended or unsystematic uses of
findings within the organization.

The third dimension,

time, considers the chronology of the evaluations and their
eventual uses, taking into account short-term,
intermediate, and long-term periods of time.

Interview

responses are coded into each of Kirkhart’s dimensions and
sub-dimensions, and the 22 evaluation reports are similarly
catalogued.
Using Kirkhart’s influence framework as a lens for
examining humanitarian response evaluations allows for a
structured way of looking at whether her three dimensions
account for the factors of distribution and dissemination,
format, timing, and decision-making patterns, as well as
any other factors that emerge.

The extent to which her

framework explains what happens in the utilization of
emergency response evaluations can be instructive in
pinpointing what is unique to this genre of evaluations,
and what is universal.

Furthermore, her treatment of

process use as parallel to (rather than as an afterthought
to) results-based use is an interesting test for an
organization self-professed to be results-oriented.
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Specifically, the analysis consists of reviewing the
coded interview and evaluation report data and sorting it
into a matrix using Kirkhart’s categories:
SOURCE OF INFLUENCE

•
•

Process

•
•

Intended

Results
INTENTION

Unintended

TIME

•
•
•

Immediate
End-of-Cycle
Long-term

3.5 Framework and Data
The aim of the meta-analysis of evaluation reports was
to catalogue their content and format so as to have a
picture of CARE’s current evaluation scene.

This allowed a

subsequent construction of a context-specific theory of
influence for CARE’s emergency response, using Kirkhart’s
framework as the underpinning.

Appendix B is the meta-

evaluation checklist used as a basis for reviewing these 25
evaluations.

The checklist combines criteria from the

following sources:
1) MEGA Evaluations.

Beginning in 2000, CARE hired an

independent consultant to conduct a meta-analysis of
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its evaluations three times.

These MEGAs (Meta-

Evaluations of Goal Achievement in CARE Projects)
include, but are not limited to, emergency
evaluations.

Among the recommendations of the MEGAs

is that all CARE evaluations contain a “lessons
learned” section.

This is, in fact, characteristic of

CARE’s more recent disaster evaluations.

But are the

lessons really learned? If so, what does the learning
look like? If not, what might CARE do to ensure that
the lessons are better learned in the future?
2) ALNAP Quality Proforma. In 2001, ALNAP developed a
tool designed to help organizations determine the
quality of their evaluation reports.

The Proforma

purports to tap into current internationally
recognized best practices.
3) CARE International Evaluation Standards.

CARE

International has a set of standards to which the
organization as a whole adheres, in principle.
The primary objective of this first exercise was to
establish the patterns and types of lessons-learned and
recommendations in CARE humanitarian aid evaluations.
For the second data source, a preliminary scan of the
above-mentioned 22 evaluations resulted in the following
interviewee categories:
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

senior management;
external relations;
finance;
human resources;
security;
procurement and logistics;
learning and knowledge management;
country and program directors;
evaluators.

An intern at CARE also scanned the content of the
evaluation reports for patterns.

Her observations and

conclusions confirmed those of the researcher.
In addition to the scan of the 22 evaluations, the
researcher conducted five pre-interviews with individuals
representing different pieces in CARE’s evaluation process.
The researcher identified these five individuals with the
help of Jock Baker, CARE International’s Coordinator for
Monitoring and Evaluation for emergencies.

The 30 total

interviewees, representing various facets of the emergency
response process (and varying levels of authority within
the organization), answered questions about evaluation use
within the organization.

Appendix D is a list of interview

questions for the second data source.

The interview

questions have sub-probes which account for the different
individuals’ roles within the organization.

The researcher

conducted all of the interviews personally, though CARE’s
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Coordinator for Monitoring and Evaluation of emergencies
accompanied her for the first three interviews to assure
that she was interviewing effectively and taking notes that
reflected actual discussion. Rather than collect audio
recordings of the interviews, which would have been
exceedingly difficult given that several of the interviews
with individuals residing overseas took place by telephone,
the researcher took handwritten or typed notes during the
dialogue and then filled in the notes with detail
immediately after the interview.

In the evening of the day

following an interview, the researcher typed up the notes
and e-mailed them to the interviewee so that he or she
could review the notes for accuracy and any additional
comments.

Though the fact that the researcher conducted

the interviews personally calls into question the
impartiality of the data, she suggests that it also assures
consistency given the semi-structured nature of the
questioning.
Henry and Mark present a theory of influence for
evaluation that specifically hones in on which elements of
evaluation affect what they term ‘social betterment,’ the
“…improvement of social conditions.” This makes their
theory an appropriate vehicle for studying the case of
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CARE, an INGO whose primary mission is to serve the poor.
ANALYSIS
Henry and Mark liken an evaluation to an intervention
in that an evaluation effects change, for better or for
worse.

That change might come from the process of

evaluating or from the evaluations findings; it might be
intentional or unintentional.

Henry and Mark propose a

theory that is to be recognizable in numerous settings.
Their theory includes a number of different forms
evaluation influence might take, allowing one to use their
framework as a guide to formulating a case-specific theory
of influence.

This study puts forth a theory for the case

of CARE which has implications for similar INGOs and other
nonprofits.
Drawing from several social science traditions, Henry
and Mark delineate three levels of evaluation influence:
individual, interpersonal, and collective. The individual
level involves a single person altering his or her thoughts
or behavior as a result of participating in an evaluation
or being exposed to evaluation findings.

The interpersonal

level includes the effect of the evaluation on the
relationship between individuals.

The collective level

refers to change occurring in an organization as a result
of the process or findings of an evaluation. Henry and Mark
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break down each of these levels by means of a taxonomy that
lays out the forms of influence specific to each level.

It

is this taxonomy that serves as the fundamental framework
for analysis of whether and how evaluation influence occurs
in an emergency response organization.
Analysis of the meta-evaluations and interviews draws
from Henry and Mark’s discussion of possible pathways of
influence and their corresponding framework.

Their

taxonomy of three levels of influence with corresponding
forms of influence offers a sort of checklist for
identifying influence instances through the interviews of
CARE personnel.

The interview data will be aligned with

the evaluation reports themselves for an exploration of
whether the evaluation influences pinpointed in the
interview data are consistent with the lessons-learned and
recommendations put forth in the evaluation reports.
The analysis considers each mechanism within each
level of influence in Henry and Mark’s framework.
Specifically:
INDIVIDUAL – there are six potential outcomes of evaluation
at this level.
Direction or valence of an attitude change – this research
scans each interview for examples of a change in attitude,
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positive or negative, about the intervention being
evaluated or about the disaster relief program as a whole.
Behavior change – this looks not merely at attitude, but at
change in how an individual acts as a direct result of
participating in an evaluation or reading an evaluation
report.
Salience – this category refers to the importance an
individual gives to an idea. In the case of CARE and
emergency response, interview data will be culled for
whether evaluation findings raised or lowered the
priorities of the interviewees vis-à-vis CARE’s disaster
relief approach and strategies.
Elaboration – this refers to the extent to which a person
thinks about or mentally processes a given issue.

This is

particularly pertinent to the CARE case, as one of their
key evaluation formats, the After Action Review, has
thoughtful reflection as a central component of the
evaluation process.
Priming – this mechanism brings a given idea or concept to
the forefront, setting it up to have an impact on judgments
or decisions.

For the CARE case, priming could have as

much to do with the evaluation reports as with the
interview data; executive summaries may highlight certain
issues and give cursory treatment to others.
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Skill acquisition – this refers to increasing one’s
competence in a skill area via participating in the process
of evaluation.

For the case of CARE, this mechanism has a

natural home with the After Action Review, which typically
has small group work and could lead to enhanced
collaboration skills.
INTERPERSONAL – the types of influence falling under the
interpersonal column include:
Justification – this involves using the conclusions from an
evaluation report to back up one’s prior convictions about
an issue. This can be either a positive or a negative
phenomenon.

Though an important role for evaluation

findings, justification may be difficult to observe through
interview data because few if any of the interviewees would
have been in a position to use an evaluation report this
way.
Persuasion - This refers to attitude change that one
individual attempts to bring about in another; evaluation
findings can be a central tool here.

In the case of CARE,

this might be a way in which an evaluation of one response
might yield findings that one individual uses to persuade
another to act in a certain manner for a future emergency
response.
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Change agent – this is where participating in an evaluation
or reading the findings from an evaluation can lead an
individual to take focused action on bringing change about.
For the CARE case, this could manifest itself in country
directors who help to lead CARE’s response for an
emergency, and then find themselves in other emergencies
later.
Social norms – these are agreed-upon principles about how
to conduct oneself in a given setting. This could be
difficult to observe through interview data, as change in
norms can be so subtle that those involved are not aware of
the change taking place.
Minority-opinion influence – This mechanism has to do with
altering the opinion of those whose attitude does not align
with the majority.

Evaluation findings can be a tool for

encouraging attitude change.
COLLECTIVE ACTION – there are four versions of influence at
this level.
Agenda setting – this is about getting an issue on the
docket for public and/or government consideration, whether
through the media or by some other means.

For CARE, this

might not trace back specifically to evaluation findings,
because the organization is arranged in such a way that
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those involved with public and media relations are not
always direct recipients of evaluation reports, nor do they
typically participate in the process.
Policy-oriented learning – this refers to attitude change
about policy objectives that come about because of
evaluation results.

In the case of CARE, more than one

evaluation report might be needed to effect such a change.
Policy change – related to the above two mechanisms, this
form of influence involves an actual shift in policy in the
operating environment that results from evaluation
findings. Henry and Mark point out that negative evaluation
findings might well bring about policy change more than do
positive findings.
diffusion – like policy change, this involves a policy
shift, but diffusion is about the spread of policy change
beyond the operating environment to other contexts.
CARE, this could be other INGOs.

For

This study uses the

above-described taxonomy as a checklist that parses the
interview data so as to identify which forms of influence
evaluations have within CARE, if any.
Coding of Interview Data
To code the interview data, the researcher created a
coding scheme based on Henry and Mark’s theory of
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evaluation influence.

She assumed that not all of their

categories might appear in this particular set of data.
She assigned decision-making criteria to each category so
as to discern where to place each piece of interview data.
In the instances where there was overlap (for example, the
same instance of influence occurring at both an individual
level and at an interpersonal level), she coded the piece
of data for both categories.

She created an “other”

category for any data that seemed not to fit Henry and
Mark’s categories.

In the final analysis, this “other”

category became the source for speculation about creating
additional categories for a theory representing the
dynamics of evaluation influence in humanitarian relief
INGOs.

These coded interviews are then matched with the

evaluation reports to identify instances of intended
influence.

The following is the coding schema for the

interview data:
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Table 1. Coding Scheme for Interview Data
INFLUENCES

IND-AC

Individual

Attitude
Change

CODE

DECISION-MAKING
CRITERIA
Any reference at all to
individual attitude about
a program are coded INDAC.
These are then culled for
instances of actual shift
in attitude resulting from
either from participating
in an evaluation or from
learning of the
evaluation’s findings.

Salience

IND-S

Elaboration

IND-E

Priming

IND-P
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Distinct from IND-AC, this
goes beyond a change in
attitude and is about a
priority shift. Example:
an issue as an agenda item
at a major planning
meeting as a result of an
evaluation lesson-learned.
Thinking about an issue or
situation because of
participation in an
evaluation or because of
having read a report.
Any instance of an issue
rising to the forefront as
a result of positioning
(such as prominence in an
executive summary) or
because of the event
circumstances themselves
(as with the heavily
media-covered 2004
tsunami).

Table 1.
Skill
Acquisition

IND-SA

Behavioral
Change

IND-BC

Interpersonal

Justification

INT-J

Persuasion

INT-P

Change
Agent

INT-CA

Social
Norms

INT-SN

MinorityOpinion
Influence

INT-MOI
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Newly learned or honed
skills, such as SWAT
analysis in an AAR
Documented instance of
change in operating
procedure as a result of
an evaluation. Should
match up with an
evaluation report.
Use of evaluation findings
in meetings or elsewhere
to make a case for an
action or priority
Like INT-J, but goes
further: not merely a
presentation but an
attempt to change others’
minds
Participation in an
evaluation, as an
evaluator or an
interviewee, or as a
person reading findings,
leading an individual or
group to initiate a change
effort.
Example of an evaluation
affecting social behavior
of those in contact with
it.
Like INT-P, but specific
to a group whose position
is that of the minority.

Collective

Table 1.
Agenda
Setting

C-AS

An issue emerging from an
evaluation that shows up
on a meeting agenda for
CARE and / or for other
INGOs implicated in the
effort

PolicyOriented
Learning

C-POL

Policy
Change

C-PC

Diffusion

C-D

One or more evaluation
report(s) leads to
increased understanding at
the policy-making level of
the organization.
Like C-POL, but with
actual policy change, not
merely learning.
Policy, program, or
practice change resulting
from a different
evaluation, either at CARE
or at related agencies.

OTHER

OTH

3.5 EXPECTED FINDINGS
Transcripts from five preliminary interviews suggest
that more influence occurs at the individual and
interpersonal levels than at the collective level.

Indeed,

the analysis that follows concludes that it is easier to
identify examples of influence at the individual level and,
to an extent, at the interpersonal level than it is at the
collective level.

Within these three levels, process-

related influence forms are more relevant to some CARE
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types of evaluations, whereas evaluation findings, end
results, are more pertinent to other forms.

The analysis

following will put forth a fourth level that clarifies the
complex dynamics of influence within a large transnational
INGO.

It remains to be seen whether the conclusions will

be generalizeable to other INGOs working in the same
capacity as CARE.
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CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction
The findings for this research are presented two
parts: findings from the initial review of the 25
evaluations CARE conducted on its emergency response
activities from 2000-2005, and the data from the 25
interviews that sounded out Henry and Mark’s framework for
evaluation influence.

The section on the content of the 22

evaluations includes a detailed look at CARE’s response to
Tropical Storm Jeanne in Haiti.

The five pre-interviews

resulted in the choice of the Tropical Storm Jeanne
evaluation as a highlight; three of the five individuals
selected proposed that particular evaluation as a good
example of how it “should” be done and of the potential
evaluation has as a tool for organizational improvement.
Though there is a graphic representation of the interview
data included in this chapter, the bulk of the data can be
found in the appendices.
The analysis concludes that there are more instances
of evaluation influence at the individual and interpersonal
levels than at the collective level; that is, the influence
of the evaluation reports is not reaching the policymaking
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level of the organization or of its peer community.

The

perception among the interviewees was largely that
evaluation report findings are under-used, if they are used
at all.
What is perhaps most intriguing about the findings is
that the Mark and Henry framework brings out subtle and
unintended forms of evaluation influence that not only have
implications for how the organization might evaluation more
efficiently and effectively in the future, but also point
to where in the chain of events the evaluations fall short
of provoking policy-level change.

The Henry and Mark

framework proves to be, for the most part, adaptable to the
context of the large transnational INGO, and their “menu,”
with the addition of a context-specific level of influence,
turns out to be a useful tool for identifying instances and
forms of evaluation influence.

For this study, the

framework was awkward as a tool for subsequently mapping
“pathways” of influence, but nevertheless was useable for
this case.

Also, perhaps just as interesting as the

instances of influence that emerged were the “noninstances” – that is, the undercurrents hinted at by
interviewees that did not fit neatly into the framework’s
mechanisms.

These ‘non-events’ coupled with the

identifiable mechanisms of influence tell an interesting
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story of how evaluations affect the organization, as well
as how they potentially could.
4.2 Evaluation Reports
The initial meta-evaluation of the evaluation reports
served the purpose of assessing the general themes among
the recommendations and lessons-learned in the reports, as
well as providing a snapshot of the gamut of format and
quality characteristics of the reports. The checklist
employed for the meta-evaluation, described in detail in
chapter 3, drew from four sources relevant to the
evaluations’ goals and standards.

The evaluation reports

varied widely in terms of content and format, not
surprising given that the evaluators themselves varied a
great deal in their experience and style.

Also, almost all

of the reports were written before CARE International
instituted an overarching evaluation policy2. Though the
variation made comparison challenging, there were
recognizable themes throughout the reports. There are three
types of evaluations represented:

2

CARE’s Senior Advisor for Design, Monitoring and
Evaluation paired with CARE’s evaluation specialist to
produce a set of evaluation standards for CARE
International. The standards are meant to apply to all
evaluations undertaken within CARE International. These
standards were formally accepted in 2006.
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After Action Reviews, also called Lessons-Learned
Workshops, are weekend-long reflection sessions taking
place right after an emergency intervention.

At least a

cross-section, if not all, of the individuals involved in
the intervention are invited to participate.

The aim of

the After Action Review is to assess the intervention while
it is still fresh in people’s minds, think about how to
improve on it, and identify opportunities acted upon and
opportunities lost. Of the evaluation reports reviewed, 10
were After Action Reviews, with six of those from CARE’s
response in various countries to the Asian tsunami of 2004.

Real Time Evaluations take place in the middle of an
intervention and are intended to be a check-in on how the
intervention is progressing and on what might be improved
upon.

It takes place in the middle of the process and

involves just a few individuals (in contrast to an After
Action Review, the Real Time Evaluation cannot involve a
large number of employees because most are occupied with
the intervention. In an emergency situation, the luxury of
involving all participants would mean a lesser response).
It is meant to inform the rest of the intervention.
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Final Evaluations occur after the intervention has taken
place and any temporary employees have gone on to other
projects.

The goal is to capsulate the intervention and to

gather information for informing later planning efforts.
Final evaluations usually involve an external3 evaluator. An
example of a Final Evaluation:

Evaluation
of
CARE
Afghanistan’s
Emergency
Response, September 2002
This final evaluation of CARE’s Afghanistan
response resulted in a 64-page final report.
An
external evaluator and an internal evaluator
teamed up to conduct the evaluation.
The
extensive evaluation consisted of a site visit,
telephone and in-person interviews, surveys of
CARE staff and of beneficiaries, and a document
review.
The summary of recommendations makes
the substantial length of the final report more
manageable for the reader.
The evaluation
report concludes that CARE’s overall response was
effective and that CARE is well-received in
Afghanistan. Highlights from the recommendations
include clarification of lines of authority and
roles, especially with temporary staff, and
contingency plans for emergency responses.

3

Michael Scriven (1991) distinguishes between internal
evaluators, employed by the organization, and external
evaluators, coming from outside of the organization. This
is an important distinction in any evaluation setting, and
CARE is no different. Several interviewees commented that
“external” evaluators are often former CARE employees who
found that contract work suited them better than working in
what is perceived to be a bureaucracy. A few interviewees
also remarked that the organizational politics favored
external evaluators, but that CARE is a complex
organization for an outsider to understand immediately.
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A subset of the Final Evaluations, called Joint
Evaluations, is also represented; in this study, these are
uniquely a phenomenon of the Asian Tsunami response of
2004.

Several large-scale NGOs, prominent in their

response to the tsunami disaster, elected to participate
together in a joint evaluation of their efforts. A large
goal of their efforts was to determine who did what and to
identify competitive advantage, that is, who is better
equipped to handle which parts of an emergency for maximum
effectiveness.

Some of these joint evaluations were

products of the ECB (emergency capacity-building) project,
a Gates foundation-funded effort to improve the
collaboration between the most far-reaching NGOs on
emergency issues.
The 22 CARE evaluation reports reviewed for this
exercise (all of the evaluations conducted between 2000 and
2005) were, for the most part, lengthy. The reports range
from 2-page summaries to 78-page reviews, with the majority
of the reports containing 25+ pages.

The exception to this

is the After Action Review (AAR) summaries, which attempt
to capture information from a few days of reflection rather
than from the duration of an entire program.

Most of the

reports contain an executive summary, but in some cases
these summaries consist of a few pages highlighting the
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report’s main lessons-learned, whereas in other cases, the
executive summary is a mere paragraph or two generally
explaining the study.

This suggests that those preparing

the reports are doing so without explicit guidelines as to
whether or how to prepare the executive summary.

The

lessons-learned and recommendations themselves vary
considerably as far as quantity and depth.

Moreover, only

a few evaluations make a distinction between “lessonslearned” and “recommendations,” and none explain what
constitutes a “lesson-learned.”

A firm understanding of

what a “lesson learned” is – and what it isn’t – could be a
useful construct for CARE. Naming something a “lesson
learned” has a different connotation from naming it a
“recommendation”; the former implies that the message has
been internalized and acted upon, while the latter suggests
that the suggestion be followed up with action.

As far as

methodology, most of the evaluations relied on interviews
and document review, with the exception of AARs, which
involve interactive dialogue/reflection.
Beneficiaries
The evaluation reports included the occasional call
for greater inclusion of beneficiaries in project design:
Afghanistan 2002, for example, recommended increasing
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consultation with beneficiaries for emergency projects.
Sri Lanka/India 2005 noted that the emergency response
suffered in instances where beneficiary consultation was
sacrificed for efficiency’s sake. However, beneficiaryfocused recommendations, or accountability to
beneficiaries, were the exception rather than the rule in
these reports.

It should be noted that for the evaluation

reports falling outside of the scope of this study (for
those projects concerned with long-term development and
rehabilitation, beneficiaries are a more central feature in
the recommendations).

Furthermore, though the evaluations

seem at first glance not to focus much on emergency
assistance beneficiaries; this could be a function of
language confusion.

One evaluator’s “beneficiary” may be

another evaluator’s “community,” a term with very different
connotations.

Notably, the Hurricane Jeanne evaluation for

Haiti mentions the needs assessment conducted with
beneficiaries there as a “good practice” that CARE would do
well to replicate elsewhere.
Decision-making
Chain of command, or lines of authority, is one of the
most central themes to emerge from the evaluation reports.
Moreover, recommendations to specify or clarify the chain
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of command cut across regions, type of emergency, and time.
Examples of lessons-learned involving chain of command
include:
CARE’s overall disaster planning has not established clear
“emergency” roles, responsibilities and procedures for
deploying staff. Deploying emergency staff learned by
trial and error. (India 2001)
Clarify lines of authority…national offices should follow
up with country offices on reporting deadlines (Afghanistan
2002)
Reporting lines within a country office should be rearticulated as soon as possible after arrival of external
emergency response personnel (West Bank/Gaza 2002)
Facilitate clarifications of roles and responsibilities of
CO and CERT staff (Iraq 2003)
Divisions of labor need to be clearly defined (DRC 2004)
Lines of responsibility and leadership should be clearly
defined (Haiti 2004)
The majority of the evaluation reports reviewed
include some version of a recommendation regarding
clarifying lines of authority, visits from senior
management, and follow-up on responsibilities.

The

various recommendations related to lines of authority do
not all point to the same suggested structure, but it is
clear that established lines of communication and reporting
are a priority at all levels of emergency response and
directly affect the efficacy of the response.
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Human Resources and Personnel
Training for staff deployed to an emergency.

This

involves orientation to CARE and how it is organized, as
well as familiarizing deployed personnel with local
procedures and operations.

Training local staff, using

local training methods as appropriate, is also a common
theme. The Afghanistan 2002 evaluation report is
particularly detailed in training observations and
recommendations.

The added workload for disaster response is a recurring
concern throughout the reports reviewed:
“Concern has been expressed that many CARE staff now remain
with workloads exponentially increased from pre-disaster
days…a closer examination of the current division of labour
and staff efficiency/motivation would now be useful.”
(Haiti Hurricane Jeanne final report)

Also, four evaluation reports bring up the need for having
a terms-of-reference (ToR) for every person deployed to an
emergency, or having generic ToRs as part of the CO’s
preparedness plan.

The need for acceptable living conditions for deployed
staff was a concern in three reports. Three reports
recommended maintaining an active roster of available and
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qualified persons for emergencies, suggesting that if such
a thing indeed already exists, that is not always the
perception in the moment.

Finally, three reports

recommended having a senior staff person or senior
management person visit the site of the emergency as early
as possible into the response.

This sentiment is echoed in

the interview portion of this study; buy-in on the part of
senior management is regarded as critical to morale.
Preparedness Planning
In contrast to the interviews, only a few of the
evaluation reports mention preparedness among the lessonslearned; one calls for revising the CI emergency manual.
The India lessons-learned from the tsunami response stands
out as emphasizing the need for better preparedness in
several areas, including procurement, policies, and long
term strategy.

Five reports mention risk reduction and

contingency planning as necessities for better efficiency
in the future.

As with “beneficiaries” above,

“preparedness planning” is a term that is just as often
called something else, such as contingency planning or risk
reduction.
Procurement and Logistics
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Procurement received little mention in the evaluation
reports, and in general, procurement-related
recommendations were specific to the context in which they
were observed rather than being generalizeable CARE-wide.
The evaluation report for Albania (2000) recommended a
permanent procurement capacity.

The India earthquake

report mentioned the need for a procurement database.
Procurement was of greater priority in the interviews than
in the evaluation reports reviewed.

Many of the logistics

observations concerned communications and the need for
adequate devices.

The Iraq RTE specifically recommended a

minimum standard for procurement for critical items such as
vehicles.
Finance
One evaluation report recommended a finance manager
for the start of any emergency operation.

The Iraq report

recommends bringing in an external finance manager if
resources allow.

Some reports included situation-specific

suggestions for soliciting funding (e.g. the 2001 Kenya
report suggested simultaneously seeking funding for
environmental rehabilitation).

A couple of reports

recommended a CI emergency fund for a more immediate
capability in disaster response situations.
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Psychological issues
Four evaluation reports mentioned the psychological
duress characterizing emergency response staff.

The

evaluation on Tropical Storm Jeanne, for example, comments
that psychological support was an obvious staff need and
was late in coming.

The Darfur Real Time Evaluation

report, similarly, highlighted the importance of counseling
both for the displaced Sudanese and for CARE staff for
coping with the crisis.

The Kosovo After Action Review

recommended the continuation of provision of counseling to
staff.

The Multi-Agency evaluation for Thailand and

Indonesia noted the great need for psychological healing on
the part of both victims and response staff, noting that
current resources are not adequate.
Communications
Communications recommendations range from observations
about the need for reliable technology to comments about
the criticality of a seamless flow of information.
theme also emerged in the interviews.

This

Though many of the

communications recommendations were situation and contextspecific, the over-arching theme was that lines of
communication need to be established between CARE factions
for each and every emergency response.
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The Multi Agency

Evaluations asserted that coordination among relief
agencies is essential to an effective response, remarking
in more than one instance that the current level of
coordination between agencies is not sufficient.
Security
Not surprisingly, security came up only in the
conflict-area emergency evaluation reports, such as
Afghanistan and West bank/Gaza.

Two reports (Afghanistan,

Iraq) recommended that CI develop a security protocol.

The

Darfur report expressed a desire that security plans be in
place prior to a crisis in volatile settings such as
Darfur.
Project Plan
Aspects of project planning / preparedness came up
frequently in the evaluation reports.

Some distinguished

between short-term planning and mid-to long-range planning
strategies.

The need for a situation analysis to precede

any response was a recurring theme.

The sentiment emerging

from the reports is that a recognized emergency
preparedness plan would help CARE in responding more
rapidly to crises.
Public Relations / Information Management

103

A number of reports mentioned a desire to cultivate
relations with external partners in order to respond more
efficiently.

One of the After Action Reviews recommended

training more individuals to respond to the media’s
questions, as the few who were trained to respond were
fatigued.

Very little mention was made of information

management, except in the context of the desire to improve
internal lines of communication and reporting.
Policy/Advocacy

Policy and advocacy came up frequently in the
evaluation reports; they emerged less in the individual
interviews.

However, one report (Afghanistan) referred to

advocacy as an “appropriate” response for CARE due to a
perception on the part of other agencies that CARE is
strong in that area.

The India earthquake evaluation

report suggested that advocacy for beneficiaries would
provide for informing them of their right to relief and
assistance.
Evaluation and learning
Just two of the reports mentioned lessons learned from
past evaluations or reviews.

Three reports called for

building adequate evaluation resources into all emergency
plans and budgets; corollary to that, three reports brought
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up the need for early and/or consistent data collection as
far as emergency response.

Finally, having minimum

standards or guidelines for monitoring and evaluation was a
recurring recommendation.
Effective evaluation report utilization: Tropical Storm
Jeanne
More than one interviewee pointed to the evaluation
and After Action Review for Tropical Storm Jeanne in Haiti
as a model of how evaluation can effectively inform
planning and preparedness.

What accounts for the perceived

strength of this evaluation process?
Timing.

The original relief effort required 500 and

then 600 staff.

Though it seemed important to assess the

relief effort early in the response so as to include staff
and avoid losing information, the reality was that the
staff was stretched to its limits with the response effort.
An initial review in January 2005 following the September
storm allowed for the participation of a good cross-section
of staff, despite the fact that some had already departed.
Moreover, the completion of the full evaluation report in
March allowed for its use in the Haiti country office’
annual planning event in April.

The report identified

resource gaps, such as storage and distribution points for
potable water, that the planning session was able to
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address for the following fiscal year.

The report further

provided fodder for scenario-building and subsequent
contingency planning by painting a visualizeable picture of
the situation.
Morale.

The Haiti After-Action Review and thorough

subsequent evaluation both provided a forum for staff to
reflect and highlighted what they had done well in the
response, rather than remaining limited to listing where
their response effort had fallen short.
Communicability.

In addition to including a local

(and francophone) staff person on the evaluation team, CARE
Haiti had the final evaluation report translated into
French, which allowed for ease in sharing it both with
local staff and with partners, such as the UN and other
NGOs.
It is interesting to note that neither the interviews
nor the evaluations themselves for Tropical Storm Jeanne
particularly followed Kirkhart’s proposed dimensions for
evaluation influence, despite the evaluation’s repeatedly
having been touted among interviewees as a good example of
an evaluation that “worked.”
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B. Interview data
The interviews, conducted between March 2006 and
August 2006, tapped 25 individuals identified through
preliminary research and data-gathering as having a range
of roles within the CARE international emergency response
structure.
Interviewees represented different tiers of the emergency
response framework within CARE.

Respondents ranged from

those on the “front lines” directly involved with the
emergency response to those on the executive level.

There

were 30 formal interviews supplemented with several
informal conversations and interview follow-up discussions.
Interviews were conducted both by telephone and in person,
and averaged about 45 minutes apiece.

The interview

protocol (see Appendix) provided a loose format for the
semi-structured discussions.
The most common refrain from the interviews was the
desire for shorter, more pointed evaluation reports.

Those

on the front lines remarked that they did not have the
luxury of time to read lengthy reports and do their jobs in
the field; those at the executive level commented that they
did not need 40 pages worth of information in order to use
the reports to make good policy judgments.
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One person

specifically recommended a maximum length of 20 pages; most
wished simply for recommendations to be on top, separate
from the main text body.

Three interviewees called for

the recommendations to be categorized by job
responsibilities, such as finance, human resources,
security, etc.
Corollary to the length, many interviewees felt that
the distribution of evaluation reports is inconsistent.
Some were not sure whether they receive the reports
consistently or not.

Very few of the interviewees seemed

to know where to look if they wanted to locate a repository
of reports; only one interviewee mentioned Livelink (CARE’s
repository for the reports and other information)
specifically.
The focus of the evaluation reports was also of
concern to many of the interviewees.

The overarching

sentiment was that they did not have time to read through
and pick out the lessons-learned that applied to their
specific tasks, nor the time to go through old evaluation
reports when dealing with a new emergency.
Furthermore, there was a question among interviewees of
accountability, of whose ultimate responsibility it is to
assure that lessons are, in fact, “learned”.
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Those interviewees working on a more operational level
experience the evaluation reports as being mired in the
theoretical rather than having a practical structure for
executing the recommendations.

They described the reports

as often being too “theoretical” or “academic.” Simple
language was an expressed desire, as was regular
translation into French and Spanish.
Several interviewees mentioned a lack of a learning
culture within CARE, a lack of structure into which
learning could be fed and retained.

This culture, for

many, was about attitudes and behavior rather than about
organizational structure.

Suggestions included looking to

other models perceived as successful, such as that of World
Vision International (one person specifically mentioned
WVI’s comparatively well-organized procurement system for
emergencies) or even corporate models.
The interviews yielded very few examples of lessonslearned from evaluation reports that led directly to
actions meant to address them.

Most interviewees

acknowledged that such learning would be great, but had the
attitude that it is not realistic.

Several interviewees

attribute this to capacity; emergency response is ‘only a
part of their jobs’, and they are working beyond capacity

109

as it is, so they don’t have the luxury of sifting through
lengthy reports and learning from them.
The desire to be more involved during the evaluation
process was a recurring theme in the interview process.
Three interviewees remarked that if they had been
interviewed for an evaluation, or had been asked to
participate in an after action review, they would have been
more likely to read the ensuing evaluation report.

Another

frequent refrain was the issue of accountability; there is
no incentive for following up on recommendations, and no
penalty for not doing so.

Interviewees offered their

opinions of who ought to be following up to assure that
evaluation recommendations were implemented (it was never
the interviewee’s responsibility).

Interviewees seemed

genuinely to want to do their job well and do it better if
possible; evaluations were seen as time-consuming and a
hindrance, rather than a means to that end.

Henry and Mark Application
Henry and Mark’s Levels of Influence framework
proposes to provide a sort of menu from which the evaluator
can construct a context-specific framework to represent the
forms of influence she observes.

That is to say that Henry

and Mark do not suggest that all of their categories of
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influence will be present in all settings.

Though all of

the categories of influence in their taxonomy were
considered in the coding scheme, not all of them were
relevant to the line of questioning in the interviews.
Coding the interview data to the categories in Henry and
Mark’s framework proved to reinforce the conclusion that
influence is occurring much more at the individual level
than at the collective (organizational) level.
The coding scheme for the study followed Henry and
Mark’s framework item by item.

Though the researcher did

not expect to find examples of every one of Henry and
Mark’s categories of influence –- they themselves portray
the framework as a ‘menu’ from which to choose rather than
as a definitive model – she included every one of their
categories in the initial coding scheme.

She used a simple

spreadsheet to organize the data. After coding the
interview data, the researcher matched the examples of
influence with evaluation report recommendations.

This

offered both a sense of how much time passed before the
influence took place, and gave a sense of whether the
influence of the evaluation was intentional or not
intentional.
Individual Level
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The individual level of influence, for Henry and Mark,
represents a change in an individual’s beliefs or behavior
as a result of having participated in an evaluation or read
an evaluation report.

Inclusion in this category does not

preclude an appearance in the interpersonal or collective
categories; rather, it is a designation for cases where
that is principally the appropriate description.

The

following examples were of individual-level forms of
evaluation influence for the CARE interview data.
Attitude Change
The evaluations of CARE’s response in Haiti to
Tropical Storm Jeanne yielded an attitude change in CARE
personnel who were involved in the response.

The country

director at the time for Haiti observed this, remarking
that when people were in the throes of the emergency
response, it was a lot easier to see where CARE’s efforts
fell short of addressing the overwhelming need.

The

evaluations, both the After Action Review and the Final
Evaluation, shifted people’s attitudes, helping them to see
that they had done some good work and made a positive
difference.

The country director’s identification of this

instance of evaluation influence is difficult to
corroborate with the evaluation reports from the After
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Action Review and the Final Evaluation, as neither report
explicitly states an intent to help workers feel better
about their work.

But another interviewee, speaking about

a different intervention, commented also that it is far
easier to make a list of things gone wrong, and that her
impression is that evaluation has the power to help people
to see what they have done well.
Behavior Change
The evaluation of the CARE India response to the
Gujarat earthquake of 2001 yielded traceable behavior
change in CARE India’s emergency procedures.

The

recommendations and lessons-learned (the heading for that
evaluation report was “major lessons-learned and
recommendations”) included a call for CARE India and CARE
International both to create operating procedures for
disaster response and to take steps to beef up disaster
preparedness capacity in general.

An interviewee from CARE

India asserted that the call for better preparedness
resulted in trained community task forces for preparedness
at the village level, as well as a regular spot for
preparedness at annual planning meetings from that point
forward.

The test for CARE India’s improved preparedness

came three years later with the tsunami response.

The

evaluation for the tsunami response found that CARE India
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was prepared and had a rapid response with timely staff
deployment.
The 2001 earthquake evaluation also criticized
procurement for not being effective enough at purchasing
and transporting needed materials.

An interviewee said

that the evaluation process brought the procurement
shortcomings to CARE India’s attention, and that CARE India
had responded to that in two concrete ways. The first was
to have vendors identified in several locations, making
distance and time less of an issue.

The second was to

designate the individual in charge of the emergency as the
procurement authority.

The 2005 evaluation of the tsunami

response in India specifically named the pre-identified
vendors as a strength in the procurement aspect of the
tsunami response.

This change occurred at the individual

level – one interviewee described how he had changed his
practice as a direct result of participating in the
earthquake evaluation.

The change also occurred at an

institutional level, and Henry and Mark’s framework does
not offer an obvious mechanism to identify this phenomenon.
This is partly due to the complexity of sorting out the
dynamics and lines of authority in transnational
confederations such as CARE.

While the individual,

interpersonal, and collective levels certainly ring true
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for designations that represent CARE, there are countryand regional- office-level relationships that need also to
be considered in where evaluation influence occurs.
The 2-day After Action Review response to the 2005
Niger food crisis also yielded behavioral change for CARE.
The evaluation report recommended training for accountants.
An interviewee from CARE Niger said that that evaluation
report helped them to create a standard – they now
stipulate that an accountant working with them must be
competent in Microsoft Excel.
The Multi-agency evaluation of the response to the
2005 Niger food crisis also led to a behavioral change,
according to a CARE Niger interviewee.

The report

discussed the need for better staff training for emergency
preparedness.

Now, CARE Niger both prepares staff for the

possibility of an emergency and recruits supplementary
staff in advance of future emergencies.
Interpersonal Level
No specific instances of the interpersonal level as
the primary level of influence emerged from this set of
interview data. This is not to say that the interpersonal
level is not relevant to the patterns of evaluation
influence exhibited at CARE. A few of the interviewees
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alluded to interpersonal dynamics; in particular, three
interviewees mentioned their perception that individuals
sometimes act as change agents, championing an evaluation
recommendation when it strikes a chord with them.

The

implication from the interviews was that this form of
influence is episodic and hard to anticipate.

None of the

interviews yielded a concrete example of this form of
influence, so it is not included in the discussion about
pathways below.

However, as is the case with any such data

set, a different sample of interviewees might well have
resulted in the emergence of instances of interpersonal
influence.

It appears to be potentially a relevant level

of influence for the humanitarian aid INGO.

Collective Level
The collective level proved challenging for
determining where and how influence occurred. CARE is
complex in that it is not strictly hierarchical and it has
country, regional, and international-level relationships
within the organization, as well as a community of peers.
The collective level of influence did not seem to fit any
of these relationships neatly.

For the purposes of the

study, the researcher interpreted “collective” to mean
CARE-wide, meaning CARE International and relationships
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between the 12 CARE International members.

The researcher

creates an intra-organizational category to capture the
layer of influence occurring more broadly than at the
individual and interpersonal level but not as extensively
as at the collective level.
Agenda Setting
In the interview data, there was one example of agenda
-setting brought about by an evaluation.

In Haiti, where

both an After Action Review and a Final Evaluation took
place, the country director affirmed that she incorporated
lessons-learned from those evaluation reports (finalized in
March 2005) into the agenda for a June annual preparedness
planning session.

She cited a streamlined potable-water

distribution plan as an action resulting from that
evaluation-influenced agenda.
Three other interviewees had the impression that
evaluation findings feed into annual and strategic
sessions, but could not offer a specific example.

Two of

those three voiced the opinion that evaluation
recommendations become agenda items when they happen to
resonate with an individual involved in the process; that
is, evaluation results are by no means systematically
included in planning agendas.
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The above examples show that when we view the CARE
case through the lens of the Henry and Mark framework, the
few instances of evaluation influence occur mostly at the
individual level, with the exception of some agenda-setting
on a broader level.

The interpersonal level did not

surface from the interview data. This could be in part due
to the limitations of the interview protocol; the questions
highlighted individual and CARE-wide experiences more than
it did the interpersonal.

Also, the category itself is

nebulous when considering the complex CARE organization.
Though interpersonal dynamics certainly exist at the level
of any given individual office, the category gets murky
when considering relating with colleagues overseas,
colleagues communicating between developing and
industrialized nations, and colleagues between main member
organizations connected to the secretariat.
Henry and Mark’s framework turns out to be a good tool
for the sorting of interview data and evaluation report
data.

Each of the instances of influence found a home in

their sub-categories, notably in the attitude change,
behavior change, and agenda-setting categories.

The levels

of influence also fit the data. However, a CARE-specific
theory of evaluation influence would include another level
of influence not represented in the Henry and Mark
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framework.

Large INGOs like CARE often have regional and

country-level decision-making centers in addition to the
main governing body.

In the case of a confederation like

CARE, the nexus of the decision-making power does not
reside solely with the CARE International secretariat.

The

regional management units have much of the coordinating
role in the event of an emergency response.

For this

reason, the collective level proved a difficult designation
to assign to the interview and evaluation report data for
CARE.

There were different levels of collective influence

that did not fit neatly into the framework.

A CARE-

specific theory of influence includes a fourth interorganizational level of influence with the same subcategories as the collective level, which applies to CAREwide or inter-INGO examples of evaluation influence.

The

inter-organizational level is for instances of influence
primarily occurring at the country office or regional
office level.

It is distinctly a different level from a

CARE-wide level of agenda-setting or policy change.
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Figure 2: Four Levels of Influence for Large INGOs
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The Henry and Mark framework includes policy-oriented
learning, policy change, and diffusion as potential
mechanisms for collective-level influence.

None of these

three mechanisms emerged from the interview data as
characteristic of evaluation influence at CARE.

This could

be in part because the mechanisms are more suited to
looking at policies than to looking at programs.
Certainly, the limited time frame for the study (2000-2005)
may have precluded the observance of policy change and
diffusion, which take time to manifest.
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Finally, it is

likely that the evaluation findings themselves fall short
of reaching policy-level decision-makers.
The intra-organizational level

The researcher proposes an intra-organizational level
for a better understanding of the influence dynamics in a
complex transnational organization.

The intra-

organizational level of influence mirrors the collective
level, because it primarily concerned with policy-level
learning and change, but learning and policies are countryor regional- office wide rather than occurring throughout
and beyond CARE as a whole.

It is distinct from the

interpersonal level because the country and regional
offices have their own sets of policies and procedures that
are sometimes necessarily region-specific.

Different

regions have different risk situations; natural resourcepoor Haiti, for instance, is chronically plagued with
weather and water problems, whereas parts of Africa
struggle more with conflict-related emergencies than with
natural disasters. Other areas experience emergencies
without being constantly disaster-prone.
The Agenda Setting category for the Intraorganizational level involves inclusion of evaluation
findings in preparedness or annual planning events.
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The

designation applies also to brainstorming or knowledgesharing events within CARE, such as the annual Crosswalk
meeting. It differs from the collective level of agendasetting, which occurs with the executive team level or
among the peer group of NGOs of which CARE is a part.
The Policy Oriented Learning category for the Intraorganizational level is about absorption of lessons-learned
at the country or regional office level. This manifests
itself, for example, in future terms of reference for
emergency evaluations that reflect lessons-learned emerging
from past emergency evaluations.
The Policy Change category for the Intraorganizational level aims at regional- or country- level
policy.

An example of this is the decision in CARE India

following the 2001 earthquake evaluation to delegate
procurement decision-making authority to the individual
directly handling the emergency (rather than by default to
the country director, or someone else).

Diffusion at the

Intra-organizational level differs from the Collective
level in that the idea diffuses from country to country or
country to region, rather than from country to CARE as a
whole or from CARE to other INGOs.
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Pathways of Influence

Henry and Mark maintain that the categories in their
framework are not mutually exclusive and, in fact, can be
integrally related as links in a causal chain.

They

present the framework as an instrument for tracing the
‘pathways’ of influence, for putting together the links in
the chain that lead from an evaluation’s initial form of
influence to an evolved form.

Identifying these pathways

then helps organizations to understand the nuanced ways in
which evaluations influence them on multiple levels, and
also helps them to plan for effective future evaluations.
Because CARE’s structure is that of a confederation
rather than strictly a hierarchy, the pathways of influence
resemble a ripple effect of droplets in a pool of water.
The few identifiable pathways of influence emerging from
this data are not identical, which suggests that
evaluations in CARE are not conducted within a cemented
institutional culture of learning.

Moreover, it is

possible that a different set of 25 interviewees would have
identified pathways of influence with a slightly different
pattern.

So the pattern in CARE’s pathways of influence is

that influence occurs episodically, as a particular issue
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resonates with an individual, rather than predictably and
systematically.
An example of this is the evaluation of CARE’s
response to Tropical Storm Jeanne in Haiti, which involved
both an After Action Review and a full Final Evaluation.
↓ The After Action Review yielded a sense among the
permanent and deployed staff of having done several
things well in the emergency response, whereas in the
midst of a crisis that was devastating to CARE Haiti
staff and families as well as to Haiti as a whole, it
was much easier to see where the intervention fell
short.
↓ The bolstered morale from the After Action Review then
set the stage for the Final Evaluation conducted two
months later.

CARE staff were willing participants in

a process that they might easily have regarded with
apprehension.
↓ The Final Evaluation, written in English and then
translated into French, was distributed beyond CARE to
the other INGOs involved locally in the intervention.
The staff of CARE Haiti also received the findings
from the evaluation.
↓ The recommendations from the final report served as
material for the preparedness planning effort in June
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of that year, as well as a couple of months later for
the annual planning event.
↓ One resulting action was the streamlining of the
storage and distribution system for potable water for
future emergencies in Haiti.
This chain of events shows that the evaluation
influenced the organization in both subtle and noticeable
ways.

An interviewee had sensed an initial reluctance on

the part of some staff who were to participate in the After
Action Review, a reluctance she attributed to fatigue from
months of work in a daunting and depressing situation.

The

staff may not have participated in the exercise because
they anticipated a morale boost, but after having
participated, they had a better picture of what they had
done well in the emergency response.

This example of one

evaluation’s influence may not have been intentional.

CARE

Haiti’s changing the practice for storing and distributing
water, in contrast, followed an intended recommendation of
the evaluation report, and is an example of direct and
instrumental use of the evaluation.
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Figure 3: Pathway of influence for Tropical Storm Jeanne

Another chain of events, from the evaluation of CARE’s
response to the Gujarat earthquake in India in 2001, bears
some similarity to the pathway for the Haiti evaluation
influence in that there was a similar mix of intended and
unintended instances of influence, as well as direct,
instrumental forms of influence alongside more subtle
examples.

The evaluation took place; the process of

evaluating and the findings themselves brought
preparedness, procurement and delegation of authority to
evaluation participants’ attention as areas in need of
improvement. CARE India took action on all three of these
themes, resulting in a more positive review of these
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aspects of emergency response in a later evaluation of a
different emergency.

Figure 4: Pathways of Influence for India Earthquake
Evaluation

Looking at how the pathways of influence shape up
instead of merely identifying the types of influence offers
insight into how the design, the timing, or the
implementation of the evaluation affect how the evaluation
influences the organization.

These give the organization

an idea of where to start in meta-evaluating how their
evaluations influence.

Identifying these pathways will

enable the organization to design ways of verifying the
impact of the evaluation.
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This study initially tried to use Kirkhart’s (2000)
Integrated Theory of Evaluation Influence to explain the
patterns of influence at CARE.

Kirkhart’s theory, while it

did not codify adequately enough to be useful for such an
application, does make a compelling case for the idea of
influence versus evaluation use and her matrix of
dimensions of influence serve as a launching point for
discussion about influence in a particular case, if it is
not particularly suited for adapting to individual
contexts.

Kirkhart, who, like Henry and Mark, espouses

the more inclusive term ‘influence’ rather than ‘use’ to
describe the effect of an evaluation on a policy or
program, proposes three ‘dimensions’ of influence for
looking at evaluations.

The intention dimension considers

whether the instance of influence was or was not an
intended result of the evaluation process or the evaluation
report. Her source of influence dimension looks at whether
the instance of influence stems from the process of
evaluating, or from the results of the evaluation.

Her

third and final dimension, time, offers three periods of
timing during which influence might have more or less
opportunity: immediate, end-of-cycle, and long-term.

All

of Kirkhart’s dimensions are relevant to the data at hand;
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the time dimension is the most difficult to observe in the
CARE data.
This observation challenge is in large part due to the
short span of time (2000-2005) over which the researcher
studied evaluations.

(This choice had mostly to do with

availability and accessibility of reports prior to 2000).
Furthermore, several of the evaluation reports studied were
of CARE’s response to the 2004 Asian tsunami in several
countries, where in some cases there was no precedent of
CARE’s having operated there prior to the tsunami.

So not

only had relatively little time passed from 2000-2005, the
period of study, but just one country in the study had an
emergency after having evaluated a prior emergency.
Comparing the evaluations of the Gujarat earthquake
response (2001) and the Indian tsunami response (2005) did
reveal longer-term effects of the first evaluation that
might not have been observable a couple of years prior.
Comparing the two India evaluations over time also
highlighted another aspect of evaluation influence: the
areas where the evaluation process and findings did not
influence the organization as intended.

The evaluation

report for the Gujarat earthquake response included a
recommendation to consult with beneficiaries in designing
the emergency response, so as to meet their needs
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adequately.

The later evaluation also recommended

consulting the local community on its needs and wishes,
suggesting that that recommendation was not, in fact, a
“lesson learned.”

It is beyond the scope of this study to

delve into why some lessons go unlearned and others end up
as agenda items for planning purposes, but discovering an
instance of a lesson unlearned alongside two lessons
learned from the same evaluation shows that the absent
examples of evaluation influence can be just as instructive
for an organization.

The idea of looking at where lessons

went unlearned, which could even be the result of negative
influence, merits further study.
The following table summarizes the instances of
influence identified through the interview data.

At first

glance, the table looks sparse. This is because many of the
interviewees perceived areas of influence that the
interviewer could not verify. Only those instances
verifiable through multiple interviews or through
corroboration with evaluation reports are recorded in the
table.

Also, there are just three evaluations represented

in the table. Many of the evaluations reviewed for the
study, most notably those from the 2004 Asian tsunami, do
not show up in the table because at the time the study was
conducted, so little time had elapsed between the
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evaluations and the interviews that it was not possible to
verify any perceived examples of influence.

The arrows in

the table indicate where instances of influence link to
become pathways.
TABLE 2. Instances of Influence

LEVELS OF INFLUENCE

INDIVIDUAL
Attitude Change
Salience
Elaboration
Priming
Skill Acquisition
Behavioral Change
INTERPERSONAL
Justification
Persuasion
Change Agent
Social Norms
Minority-Opinion
Influence
INTRAORGANIZATION
AL
Agenda Setting
Policy Oriented
Learning
Policy Change
Diffusion
COLLECTIVE
Agenda Setting
Policy Oriented
Learning
Policy Change
Diffusion

Tropical
Storm
Jeanne

India
Earthquake

Niger Food
Crisis

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

CARE’s Evaluation Influence ‘Story’
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The two pathways of influence proposed above show two
distinctly different routes from the evaluation to the
changes brought about through influence.

This is a useful

distinction because they are two different cases of
different kinds of emergencies, yet they tell a similar
story of how influence happens within CARE.

Both cases

included both an After Action Review, which is by nature a
highly participatory exercise involving individual
reflection and interpersonal dialogue, and a Final
Evaluation.

The same is true for a third example, CARE’s

response to the famine in Niger.

For all three examples,

Haiti, India, and Niger, the person(s) responsible for
getting lessons-learned on the planning agenda for going
forward had participated in (or led, in one case) the After
Action Review, and were involved at least as interviewees
in the Final Evaluation.

This may in part explain why the

influence reaches the intra-organizational level, but
consistently falls short of effecting change at the
collective organizational level or of diffusing to peer or
partner INGOs: those responsible for setting the agenda at
the collective organizational level are removed from the
front lines of the process of evaluation and have only
lengthy reports from which to sort through possible
priorities. The lessons consequently go unlearned.
132

It surprises no one that this study finds many more
examples of lessons unlearned than of lessons learned.
There are dozens of possible reasons for this.

The lessons

learned, however, are examples of intended, direct,
instrumental influence flanked by unintended and indirect
influences.

These examples lend themselves to a sort of

theory of influence specific to CARE (and possibly other
similar INGOs) in the emergency response context, a theory
of influence that can function as a tool for facilitating
evaluation influence at the planning stage of the
evaluation.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study shows that the consequence of evaluation
reports goes beyond use to encompass influence, which
includes both direct, intended evaluation results and
indirect, unintended effects.

In the case reviewed for

this study, evaluation reports were not merely windowdressing; in addition to upholding accountability, they
affected individual attitude and behavior, relationships,
and country- and regional- level change.

The factors

leading to these changes, in large part the format and
timing of the evaluations, can inform future evaluations so
that they will have greater positive influence.
So What?
The 1990s brought more media attention to INGOs and
their work than ever before.

Well-publicized scandals in

the disaster relief community at the time heightened both
the public’s concern and that of donors over INGOs’
responsible use of donated funds in responding to
emergencies.

Non-governmental organizations are

experiencing a call to action to institute or improve on
their existing systems of accountability.
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This has

resulted in a rise in evaluative activity on the part of
humanitarian aid organizations.
But the question remains as to whether this newfound
energy and effort toward greater and more rigorous
accountability results in better or more responsible work
and use of funding on the part of these INGOs. Evaluations
cost time and money at the very least, two resources which
are by definition scarce for an INGO. Any dollar wasted on
an ineffective evaluation is a dollar that might have gone
toward emergency relief supplies. So it is important to ask
whether evaluations do improve INGOs’ practice (and thereby
by extension help them to fulfill their mission and make
the world a better place).
It is not hard to believe that there were far more
cases of lessons not learned in the evaluations reviewed in
this study than of lessons learned, that is to say
recommendations that resulted in action and subsequent
improvement.

At first glance, it seems rational to expect

that a chain of actions would look something like this: a)
CARE commissions an evaluation of its response to a
particular emergency b) a team of evaluators conducts the
evaluation c) the evaluation team produces a report that
includes recommendations for how to improve on current
practice d) personnel diligently read the disseminated
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report and do their part to make sure that the
recommendations are carried out.

Of course it does not

work quite like this. If it did, there would be no body of
literature spanning three decades on evaluation
utilization.
The literature on whether and how evaluation findings
are used has evolved to consider a range of ways that
evaluation might affect an organization and its operating
environment. This sort of consequence, or ‘influence,’
looks past evaluation use to how evaluation might affect
even the broad policy climate.

As the CARE case also

shows, the evaluation influence does not have to be direct
or intentional to have a positive and worthwhile impact on
an organization.
As accountability gains prominence as an area of
importance for INGOs, the question of whether and how the
evaluations that make up the backbone of the accountability
system influence the INGO and its operating environment
looms large.

In emergency response, improving one’s

practice can have such grand effect as saving a life.

It

is also important to consider whether evaluations influence
the organization in smaller, subtler ways, even if the bulk
of the lessons appear to go unlearned.

This study has used

Henry and Mark’s framework for evaluation influence to look
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at the case of CARE, a prominent INGO in the area of
emergency response.
Limitations of the Study
Most, though not all, of the interviews conducted for
this study were with employees of CARE USA.

Though this is

in part a function of CARE USA’s comparatively significant
size and role in emergency response, it is important to
acknowledge here that the research findings represent CARE
USA more accurately or more thoroughly than they do some of
the smaller CARE members.

Also, although all of the

evaluations conducted between 2000 and 2005 were reviewed
for this study, it is important to consider that a
disproportionate number of them were from CARE’s response
to the Asian tsunami of 2004.
As with any qualitative research, there is a level of
subjectivity to this study, particularly in its heavy
reliance on interviews that capture individuals’
perceptions.

A single person conducted the interviews and

culled the evaluation reports, leaving room for the
possibility of a one-sided interpretation of the interview
and report data.

Also, selection of interviewees relied

on 6 people’s informed opinions about who would comprise a
representation of those at different levels of the
evaluation process.

The researcher conducted five pre137

interview interviews as a way of refining which questions
to ask and ascertaining whom to interview.

CARE’s

Coordinator for Quality, Accountability, and Standards then
helped the researcher to make the final selection of whom
to interview.

Though the selection of interviewees was

careful and thoughtful, 25 other interviewees might have
painted a different picture of how evaluation works at
CARE.
Discussion on the Findings
Henry and Mark’s framework for tracing evaluation
influence showed itself to be a useful tool for developing
a context-specific taxonomy that represents how and on what
levels evaluations affect people, places and policies.

In

the case of CARE, “context-specific” meant adding an Intraorganizational level of influence.

This helped to

distinguish between examples of influence that are
collective at a country or regional level from examples
that are collective at an organization-wide or peer groupwide level.

The subcategories for the Intra-organizational

level mirror those for the Collective level.
Using this modified framework to sort the interview
responses and compare them to the evaluation reports
yielded a picture of how evaluation influence comes about
in CARE’s emergency response unit.
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There were three

examples of direct, instrumental evaluation use at the
country and regional level:
o The evaluations of CARE Haiti’s response to Tropical
Storm Jeanne yielded an eventual streamlining of CARE
Haiti’s potable water storage and distribution system.
o The evaluations of CARE India’s response to the
Gujarat earthquake resulted in the delegating of
authority for procurement decisions for future
emergencies, as well as an established list of
identified local vendors of disaster relief materials.

o The evaluations of CARE India’s response to the
Gujarat earthquake prompted CARE India to develop a
concrete disaster preparedness plan.

There were also examples of more modest, not-necessarilyintended use:
o The
Storm
doing
stage

After Action Review for CARE Haiti and Tropical
Jeanne reassured emergency staff that they were
good work and making a difference. This set the
for the final evaluation two months later.

o The Tropical Storm Jeanne evaluations became the
basis for the agenda of a preparedness-planning
meeting three months later, and an annual planning
meeting two months after that.
It is easy to point to numerous recommendations from the
evaluations in the study as lessons un-learned, or
recommendations for which there is no evidence of resulting
change.

Of course, some of these are cases of countries

where there has not yet been another emergency to show
where the emergency response has improved due to
recommendations from evaluations of prior emergencies. Some
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are also cases where a different sample of interviewees
might have had different experiences of evaluation,
resulting in a different set of examples of lessons learned
and unlearned.
There is one emergency setting for which two
evaluations, one from an earlier (2001) emergency and one
from a later (2004) emergency, show that some lessons were
learned whereas others were not. Paralleling the Gujarat
earthquake evaluation findings with the tsunami India
evaluation findings suggests that though there were a
couple of areas (mentioned above)where the 2004 response
effort improved from the 2001 response, there was an area
where the lesson remained unlearned: both evaluations
concluded that it is essential to consult with the
beneficiary community about the response plan before going
ahead with the emergency response, and both recommended
that this be implemented in the future.
Other examples of evaluation influence not occurring
or not occurring systematically emerged from the interview
data.

Two interviewees who are country directors said that

evaluation findings are sometimes considered in annual
planning events, but not systematically.

Both speculated

that some evaluation recommendations find their way onto
annual planning agendas if they happen to resonate with an
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individual who champions them.

A member of CARE’s Impact

Measurement and Learning team echoed this opinion.
Another example of missed opportunity for evaluation
influence lies in personnel participation in evaluations.
Three interviewees who had task-related jobs (rather than
country director or other managerial positions) expressed
the desire to be asked to participate in After Action
Reviews or asked to give interviews for Final Evaluations.
The interviewees lamented the lost opportunity to reflect
or to offer an opinion about the emergency response.
Pathways of Influence
Mapping out the instances of influence into patterns
of chains of influence shows in the case of CARE that
evaluations have greater and farther reaching influence
than might seem on the surface to be the case.

When asked

directly about whether “lessons-learned” are actually
learned, most of the interviewees admitted to seldom if
ever reading the evaluation reports and expressed
skepticism concerning whether lessons actually get learned.
One person went so far as to say that in an emergency,
planning happens immediately and speedily, and no one is
going to reach back to the recommendations from a previous
evaluation for insight in such a moment of urgency.

The

pathways of influence illuminated in this CARE case show
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that the evaluations may have a greater effect, sometimes
in subtle ways, than the interviewees think that they do.
Both of the pathways of influence traceable in this
CARE case show the process part of the evaluation to be
important to its overall influence.

Involvement in the

process of evaluating created “buy-in” and made key people
sit up and take notice of necessary and doable changes that
could be made.

The After Action Review offered a place to

reflect and gave deployed personnel a forum for discussing
their experiences.

In the cases of Haiti/Tropical Storm

Jeanne and India/tsunami response, the After Action Review
set the stage for successful Final Evaluation activities by
creating good will on the part of personnel for
participating in the evaluation activity.

Thus, though a

substantial number of evaluation recommendations do not
become action items, the evaluation process, particularly
in the case of After Action Reviews followed by Final
Evaluations, have much value in that they can boost
participants’ morale in the midst of a depressing disaster
scene.

Participating in an evaluation can motivate a

person to pay attention to the evaluation findings.
Lessons (Un)Learned
Identifying the pathways of influence sheds some light
on why some evaluation lessons-learned receive attention
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and others do not.

As an illustration, the case of the

Haiti Tropical Storm Jeanne evaluations culminating in a
change in procedure for handling potable water was an
example of a recommendation for better preparedness that
was easy to execute. Furthermore, the preparedness planning
meeting coincided with the availability and dissemination
of the evaluation recommendations.

The ascertaining of

procurement vendors in India followed much the same
pattern.

Lessons are learned when the timing of the

evaluations and evaluation reports is good (coincides with
planning meetings without interfering with the emergency
response itself), when the evaluators are well-received or
well-regarded, or when one particular lesson resonates with
an individual who makes an extra effort to see the
recommendation carried through.
Lessons that go unlearned, however, do so for myriad
reasons. Five of the interviewees mentioned, for example,
the absence of a ‘culture of learning’ or ‘culture of
accountability’ at CARE as a culprit for not capturing
lessons-learned, and two more interviewees called it a lack
of ‘institutional memory.’ It is probably unfair to say
that CARE lacks entirely a culture of learning. After all,
CARE USA has a team of four persons whose function is to
strengthen CARE’s accountability to itself and others
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through inquiry and learning.

It may be that evaluations

are not fully realized as tools within the learning
structure.

But it would appear that evaluation of

emergency response is very slowly integrating into the
culture at CARE as a means of reflecting on past practice
and improving on future practice:
o Part of the decision to look at the 2000-2005
evaluations for this study rather than start farther
back than 2000 is that it is only in the year 2000
that there are consistent records and evaluation
reports for each emergency response in CARE’s
repository.
o CARE International adopted a carefully conceived set
of evaluation standards in 2005 that inform the design
and execution of all evaluations of policies or
programs.
o By 2005, After Action Reviews accompany all of CARE’s
evaluations of emergency response activities,
suggesting that giving deployed personnel a forum for
reflection and helping them to identify the positives
in the impact they have had is a shifting priority for
CARE.
o The 2004 Asian tsunami and the 2005 Niger food crisis
were events for which CARE participated in a multi144

agency evaluation, suggesting a comfort level in
sharing evaluation findings with peers.
An emergency can be a grisly, depressing scene. When
the needs of the afflicted are as basic as water and
shelter, a person’s instinct might be to put a response
plan in place as rapidly as possible so as to begin to
mitigate the suffering.

To paraphrase one interviewee’s

sentiments, “you’re not going to go poring back through
evaluations of former emergencies for lessons-learned
before at a time like that.” Another interviewee pointed
out that some evaluation recommendations are easier to
carry out than others are in an emergency situation. The
interviewee suggested that sometimes it is a matter of
capacity – it is not that CARE is ignoring a
recommendation, but that it does not have the capacity to
respond to it fully.

He pointed out that for the majority

of staff deployed in an emergency, emergency response is
one sliver of their job – most are not devoted to
emergencies full-time.

This is the excuse many

interviewees gave for not reading lengthy evaluation
reports; emergencies are but one small portion of their
jobs.
CARE’s Evaluation Influence vis-à-vis Its Peers
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Though it is not a main aim of this research to
compare evaluation influence between two or more INGOs in
depth, it is important to consider CARE in the setting of
its INGO peers.

This is essential because emergency

response frequently is a team effort drawing simultaneously
from the strengths of each INGO.

The effectiveness of the

emergency response is greater than the sum of the parts –
the individual INGOs – that participated.

This is clear

from the Multi-Agency Evaluations reviewed for this study;
the agencies participating in the evaluations each had
strengths that contributed to the response in ways that the
other INGOs could not on their own.

Determining how to

increase the influence of evaluations in CARE not only has
implications for similarly large, decentralized
transnational organizations, it means more useful
evaluation reports for CARE’s peers and partners in
emergency response.

The Asian tsunami of 2004 brought with

it a great deal of collaboration among INGOs because the
damage wrought was so severe as to require INGO assistance
on a massive scale.

Some of the humanitarian aid agencies

collaborated on jointly evaluating their response efforts
for the tsunami and for the 2005 food crisis in Niger.

It

is difficult to compare the respective findings for each
agency, as each had a distinct role based on its strengths
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and resources in the emergency response.

But it is

significant of a shift in culture that the agencies found
value not only in evaluating their respective activities,
but in evaluating the inter-agency collaboration with the
hope of improving on it.

Time will tell how these

evaluations influence that collaboration.
Though the other agencies4 involved in the Multi-Agency
Evaluations have a confederation structure like CARE (most
have a more traditional hierarchical structure), the
framework developed in this study and the ensuing theory
for how pathways of influence work in the CARE setting are
likely to be applicable for these other major players in
the emergency response arena because they face similar
challenges of different levels of management, from the
front lines to the country and regional level to the
executive and policy level.

All of these agencies work in

development as well as in humanitarian relief, and all of
them have been prominent figures in recent emergency
situations.

How they compare in terms of evaluation

influence within and beyond the agency is beyond the scope
of this study. However, an Overseas Development Institute

4

World Vision International, Oxfam Great Britain. Catholic
Relief Services, Save the Children, International Rescue
Committee, and Mercy Corps
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(ODI) report (2005)5 found that evaluation is a particular
area of strength for CARE, though there is not a systematic
way to integrate lessons-learned into policy formation for
the organization.
CARE-Specific Recommendations
A couple of interviewees expressed a wish that they
could participate in evaluations from other countries and
regions within CARE’s system so as to learn from their
successes and failures.

Breaking down barriers in

encouraging a dialogue of ideas and experience will promote
a learning culture (Garvin 2000).

This sort of exchange

can be instituted into the regular evaluation cycle.
The interviews highlight a particular strength within
CARE: employees really do care about doing their jobs well
and are willing to work hard at that in the most adverse of
circumstances.

When lessons go unlearned, it is not so

much a problem of indifference as it is of attitudes, time
5

The report, commissioned by the CARE International
Secretariat, addressed CARE’s perception that its emergency
response needed to be assessed and improved upon. The
report compared CARE to World Vision, Oxfam, Médecins Sans
Frontières (MSF), the International Rescue Committee (IRC),
Save the Children, and the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Society across four benchmarks: timeless of
emergency response, appropriateness of response,
proportionality (in scale) of the response, and
effectiveness in achieving objectives. The review found
that CARE has not grown as its peers have grown in terms of
its capacity to respond to emergencies.
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availability, and confusion over whose responsibility it is
to assure that change occurs.

The following are

recommendations for building a stronger culture for lessonlearning, where evaluations could be engineered to have
greater influence:
1.

Standardized Template for evaluations. The evaluation

reports reviewed are not uniform in terms of form, content
and methodology, although the more recent evaluations are
beginning to resemble each other.

A more standardized

format would be helpful for those looking to skim the
report rapidly.

It would help evaluators in ensuring that

their outputs were in line with CARE’s expectations.
Fields on the format could be linked to a searchable
database to allow easy access to lessons learned in a
concise format, either from individual evaluations or in
the form of a synthesis (e.g. a summary of recommendations
relating to human resources over the past two years).
How: The recommendation is for a standardized Terms of
Reference and evaluation format that would include:
o qualifications of the evaluator including whether
he/she has ever worked for CARE and/or “knows” CARE,
o methods used to conduct the evaluation,
o minimum baseline data collection,
o evaluation findings for a list of subcategories,
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o findings and recommendations. This last category
would have a clear distinction made between a “lesson
learned” and a “recommendation,” with a section for
“good practices,” or positive lessons-learned that
ought to be replicated.

2.

Template or guideline for AARs:

The After Action

Reviews were perceived positively by most of the
interviewees as a means of identifying lessons-learned
through evaluative reflection.

A thorough how-to for

conducting one, or at least reporting on one, would
facilitate the use of AAR findings.

How:

The AAR should take place early enough that those who

responded to the emergency are still there, but late enough
that the AAR does not interfere with the response effort.
The review should consist of reflection both on the process
of the response and on the end result.

In addition to the

individuals directly involved in the response,
representatives from human resources, procurement,
logistics, security, and external relations should be
invited to participate.

Each attendee should receive at

least a summary of the AAR notes and recommendations.
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The

facilitator should be competent in the relevant language
for the AAR.

3.

Yearly synthesis of priority themes to coincide with

planning cycle of CARE: It is clear from the interviews
conducted for this study that CARE employees, like those of
most nonprofit organizations, are time-starved from the
operational level all the way up to senior management.
Moreover, the lengthiness of the evaluation reports
dissuades people from reading them and from wading through
text to identify recommendations relevant to the
individual’s job.

An annual synthesis of important themes

and identification of themes on which to focus for the year
would assist in shaping CARE’s policy and planning agenda.
Several of the individuals interviewed envisioned this
yearly synthesis as coinciding with the end of the calendar
year in December, in anticipation of January planning
sessions for the following fiscal year.

Others saw the

Annual Operating Plan meetings as the forum for such a
synthesis.

This synthesis, with follow-up from previous

syntheses, would be appropriate at bi-annual ERWG meetings,
as well.
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How: the person responsible for quality assurance within
CARE’s emergency group would lead a synthesis exercise in
November and December of each year.

(It is important that

the person leading the exercise be thoroughly familiar with
the responses reviewed, and that the person be high enough
within CARE to assure buy-in from all concerned.
Significantly, the main researcher for this study
triangulated the scan of evaluations by having another
researcher, new to CARE, categorize the data as well.

The

two scans did not match up in terms of categorizing
findings; presumably, identifying priority areas would be
still more difficult for an individual not thoroughly
versed in CARE’s emergency response programs). The exercise
would involve reviewing any evaluation reports from the
year leading up to that point and prioritizing the
recommendations listed in each, identifying who should be
responsible for follow-up for each of the recommendations.
The synthesis would be prepared for planning meetings in
January and would not exceed 10 pages.

4.

Cover sheet for evaluation reports that can feed into

a searchable database: Individuals perceive evaluation
reports as too cumbersome to be practical for incorporating
specific lessons-learned.

The reports are lengthy, and
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recommendations targeting a specific area, such as human
resources, get lost among all the other recommendations.

A

“cover sheet” for evaluation reports, to be completed
eventually by the evaluator preparing the initial report,
would categorize lessons-learned into areas of specialty,
such as human resources, external relations, procurement,
etc, so as to facilitate the use of the report findings by
individuals who are responsible only for a slice of the
findings.

Though the evaluation reports are now easily

accessed in their Livelink location, it is more of a
repository than a database.

A database would allow

searching by region, or disaster type, or by job sector,
specifically: human resources/personnel, finance,
procurement/logistics, advocacy, security, and
monitoring/evaluation.
How: Potentially, such a cover sheet could eventually be
incorporated into a searchable database allowing users to
search for evaluation reports containing information
relevant to their jobs.

The cover sheet would be no more

than two pages long and the evaluator submitting the report
would complete the cover sheet.

Topics included on the

sheet:
o Short abstract of the emergency context
o Time frame of the response and evaluation(s)
o Country & Region
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o Sector(s)
o Type of evaluation (AAR, RTE, joint evaluation,
etc.)
o Type of emergency (conflict, natural disaster, slowonset, etc.)
o Lessons-learned categorized by job function
(logistics, procurement, human resources, external
relations, etc.)

5.

Policy on internal vs. external evaluators: The

interviewees, when queried about the plusses and minuses of
using internal versus external evaluators (internal to CARE
vs. external to CARE), responded predictably that while
external evaluators sometimes have too large a learning
curve in terms of understanding how CARE works, they bring
a fresh perspective.

Internal evaluators, on the other

hand, know how CARE is structured but can be in a
politically awkward situation within the organization or
can lack perspective.
questions.

They may not always ask the tough

Most interviewees agreed that a team of

evaluators, internal and external, is ideal when possible.
Creating a “bank” of external evaluators who are familiar
with CARE and who are known to be competent would
facilitate this.

This already exists, in a way; human

resources maintains a roster.

The recommendation is that

this resource be formalized.
How:

Though “prior CARE experience” is a criterion for

hiring evaluators, there is a perception among interviewees
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that there is great disparity between external evaluators
in terms of their understanding of CARE and their
experience as evaluators.

Formalizing, even training, a

group of emergency evaluators could assure that they know
CARE, know the desired format and content of the
evaluation, and know how to complete the “cover sheet” (see
above).

6.

Learning opportunities:

Several of the interviewees

were of the opinion that other countries and regions could
learn from their emergency response experiences, and vice
versa.

Inviting staff from other countries and/or regions

to After Action Reviews, planning meetings, participating
in evaluations as team members and other such events on a
rotating basis might enable valuable sharing and
reflection.
How:

Budget for at least one individual from a

neighboring region’s CARE office to sit in on each After
Action Review.

Share that individual’s reflections and

reactions widely. Also, systematically translate evaluation
reports into French and Spanish.
7. Clarify language for “lessons-learned,” “findings,”
“recommendations,” “best practices,” and the like. In some
evaluation reports, findings and lessons-learned are two
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different things; in others, recommendations differ
(follow) from lessons-learned.

“Best practices” and

‘lessons learned” are not so different, Patton reminds us
(2001).

This is not an issue unique to CARE, certainly6,

but certainly greater specificity of language would help to
foster a better learning culture.

There were numerous

comments in the interviews indicating confusion about who
is responsible to see that evaluation recommendations are
carried out.

This suggests that “lessons-learned” is a

misnomer, and that “recommendations” is more accurate.
Furthermore, perhaps a format specifying how to execute the
recommendation and who is logically responsible for seeing
it through would make it easier to trace.

Further Study
This study was limited to one division of one INGO,
and relied on personal recollection of evaluations that had
already taken place. Certainly, comparing two or more NGOs
would be a rich way of identifying where commonalities in
trends of influence might lie.

It would also be

interesting within one organization to study an evaluation
from its inception through a period of time following the

6

World Vision International compiled an internal document, a master
list of the year’s “lessons-learned” in 2006. The list had two
columns: the first was the lesson learned, and the second was a
recommendation for how to act on the lesson learned.
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final evaluation, or even through another emergency.

The

study was limited in that the available data represented
only one example where there were two separate emergencies
within the time period of study, allowing for observation
of which recommendations resurfaced and which seemed to
have been addressed.

It would be interesting and

valuable, also, to take Henry and Mark’s framework as it
applies to humanitarian aid agencies, and to use it to plan
an evaluation with the framework as a basis with the intent
of maximizing the influence that the evaluation will have,
and then trace whether it is in fact possible to plan an
evaluation to have greater influence.
Conclusion
Evaluations of humanitarian aid missions have the
potential to affirm and bolster staff morale, discover and
increase good practices, and highlight areas for
improvement.

CARE has experience with effective evaluation

utilization, and with some changes to its structures and
systems, has the capacity to encourage a culture of
learning while putting the framework in place for improved
practice.

Annual prioritization and synthesis of lessons-

learned, a searchable database, standardized evaluations
and reviews, and increased learning opportunities are
simple steps that can lead to a host of practical
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improvements and attitude shifts, as indeed evaluations
already have in isolated instances.

Expanding the

definition of evaluation use to influence, allowing for
unintended and indirect forms of influence, reveals
important ways in which evaluations add value to the
humanitarian aid agency’s practice. Understanding these
patterns of influence better, by identifying how they link
and form pathways, shows in this case that evaluations can,
with planning, have even greater influence and bring out
the latent potential of the agency’s learning cycle.
It is sure that NGOs are being held to ever-greater
standards of accountability, and organizations are even
popping up to help them to do so.

It is less apparent

whether these tightening standards are resulting in
evaluations that help a policy or program do its job
better; that is, make the world a better place.
Development of a theory of evaluation influence for
humanitarian assistance context takes a step toward
advancing theories of use and influence into a practical
means of planning for and implementing evaluations.
world of humanitarian relief, this could mean better
practice and saved lives.
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In the

APPENDIX A
LIST OF EVALUATIONS REVIEWED

TITLE
1. Evaluation of
CARE
Afghanistan’s
Emergency
Response

DATE
Sept
2002

TYPE
Final
Evaluation

2. Independent
Evaluation of
CARE’s
Humanitarian
Response to
flooding
Resulting from
Tropical Storm
Jeanne in Haiti

March
2005

Final
Evaluation

3. Joint
Independent
evaluation of
the Humanitarian
Re3sponse of
CARE, CRS, Save
the Children and
World Vision to
the 2005 Food
Crisis in the
Republic of
Niger
4. Final Report,
CARE
International’s
Humanitarian
Response to the
Darfur Crisis

Nov
2005

Final
Evaluation /
MAE

June
2004

RTE
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NOTES
One external,
one internal
evaluator;
site visit,
document
analysis,
interviews of
CARE staff and
beneficiaries;
64 pages
Two external
evaluators and
one internal
evaluator;
document
review, field
visits and
observations,
semistructured
interviews and
focus groups;
28 pages
Six
evaluators,
two internal;
document
review,
observation
and semistructured
interviews and
focus groups;
40 pages
Internal
evaluator;
interviews and
document
review; 13
pages

5. Executive
Summary and List
of
Recommendations,
CARE
International’s
Humanitarian
Response to the
Iraq Conflict
6. CARE
International
Real-Time
Evaluation of
the West BankGaza Crisis
7. Food emergency,
Southern Africa:
Lessons Learned
Workshop Report

Sept
2003

RTE

Three internal
evaluators;

May
2002

RTE

Internal
evaluator; 10
pages

June
2003

AAR

8. Sri Lanka and
India Multiagency
Evaluation

July
2005

Final
Evaluation/
MAE

9. Multi-Agency
Evaluation of
Tsunami
Response:
Thailand and
Indonesia

July
2005

Final
Evaluation/
MAE

Group sharing
sessions, SWOT
analysis,
intro to
SPHERE as a
monitoring and
evaluation
tool; 10 pages
Team of 5
evaluators,
including an
external
evaluator as
team leader;
52 pages
Team of 5
evaluators,
including an
external
evaluator as
team leader;
document
review, focus
groups and
interviews; 62
pages
Team of 6
evaluators;
interviews,
focus groups,
observation;
78 pages

10 CARE West Bank
May
and Gaza
2004
emergency
Programme
Strategic Review

Final
Evaluation
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11 Lessons Learned
Workshop, CARE
Ethiopia

Oct
2003

AAR

12 CARE Ethiopia
Lessons Learned
from Year 2000
Emergency
Operation
13 Hurricane
Jeanne: CARE
Haiti’s Response
to the emergency
lessons Learned
Workshop / After
Action Review

Dec
2001

Final Report

Jan
2005

AAR

March
2001

Final Report

Internal
facilitator;
chronology of
events, small
working
groups;
lessonslearned
divided into
positive and
negative; 24
pages
43 pages

AAR

61 pages

AAR

2 days of
reflections
with selected
staff; desk
review, gender
audit and
quantitative
survey; 24
pages (60+
pages with
annexes)

14 India Earthquake
Executive
Summary
15 Kosovo Crisis
Lessons Learned
Review
16 India Tsunami
Response After
Action Review

April
2005
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Group sessions
based on a
2000 lessonslearned
report; oneday workshop
33 ages

17 CARE
International in
Indonesia, Aceh
Tsunami Response
After Action
Review Workshop
18 Tsunami After
Action review,
Garowe
19 Tsunami After
Action Review,
Colombo

April
2005

AAR

March
2005

AAR

2005

AAR

20 Tsunami After
Action Review,
Thailand
21 Lessons Learned
Workshop, Niamey
– Executive
summary
22 Main Lessons
Learned,
CEG/CARE Sudan
Engagement

2005

AAR

2005

AAR

Dec
2005

Final
Evaluation
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3 days,
lessons
learned
session plus
concepts and
approaches
sessions – 44
attendees

External
evaluator ;
this “main
lessons”
document 10
pages long

APPENDIX B
MATRIX OF LESSONS-LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

AREA OF FOCUS
Beneficiaries

Lesson Learned or Recommendation
1. A CARE Haiti gender policy with
strategies and guidelines would be
useful. –Haiti 2005
2. Develop documentation to inform
communities of changes in intervention,
such as food distribution.
3. CARE staff identified needs rapidly
with communities from the start and
worked with coordination community to
organize a response to those needs.
This should be replicated.–Haiti AAR
2005
4. Train community youths in repair and
maintenance of hand pumps and provide
repair kits to each trained youth.
5. Psychosocial programming for adults
should be very closely tied to viable
livelihoods and housing programs –
group counseling sessions and linking
therapy to other community
interventions should be emphasized.
6. Both CARE and World Vision should
consider including alcoholism
prevention and counseling components
into their psycho-social programming.
7. Be sensitive to the needs and views of
the affected community when building
shelters in India.
8. Urgent -- undertake repairs to all the
soak pits in India.
9. Undertake research and study to develop
guidelines for ensuring communitydriven response.
–India and Sri Lanka MAE 2005
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10.
Urgent – watsan improvement in
settlements.
–Thailand and Indonesia MAE 2005
11.
Beneficiary selection can be
improved through a long-range approach
rather than a short-term or interim
approach. Also – coordination with
other agencies on this is desirable.
–WBG Strat Review 2004
12.
Communities were not directly
involved in the planning of emergency
responses.
13.
Government obstacles to
beneficiary selection
–Ethiopia LL 2000
14.
Improve targeting mechanisms to
account for environment with high level
of uncertainty and unreliability in
terms of relief.
15.
Build in community contribution
and participation whenever possible
–South Africa LL 2003
16.
Involve informal women leaders and
indigenous people with community and
local knowledge in the planning,
distribution, forwarding, receiving,
and benefit of project inputs.
-India Tsunami AAR
17.
Ensure that communities
participate meaningfully in relief from
day 1.
–Indonesia/Aceh AAR
18.
Needs assessments did not always
capture the communities’ changing
needs. If necessary, second needs
assessments should be developed.
19.
There was community fatigue
regarding assessments. Coordinate
better in the future.
–Garowe AAR
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20.
Need for better definition of
“affected communities” and better
identification of beneficiaries.
Staff should enter villages with a
21.
process of community analysis rather
than a prescribed set of actions.

Preparedness
and Planning

–Thailand AAR
1. Contingency planning should occur and
should include a plan for terrorist
attacks.
–Afghanistan 2002
2. Recommendation for using development
programming to enhance both
preparedness and prevention.
– Haiti 2005
3. Warning system is adequate, but
action/response late and under-scale.
– Niger MAE 2005
4. Develop risk management plan and adapt
EPP procedures and guidelines.
5. When [the emergency] hit, there was an
early warning system for drought only.
In this future, this should be
expanded, based on risk assessment.
–Haiti AAR 2005
6. CARE must find a balance between
participatory approaches/relying on
local capacity and fast, scaled-up
response.
7. CARE needs to build technical
competence and credibility in shelter
provision in India.
–Sri Lanka and India MAE 2005
8. Develop national organizational
disaster preparedness plans which
include strategies for attaining access
to remote populations; include HR
requirements, also.
–Thailand and Indonesia MAE 2005
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9. Explore with local NGOs possibilities
for capacity sharing in disaster risk
reduction.
10.
Support capacity development for
government at all levels for disaster
risk reduction and disaster management.
–Thailand and Indonesia MAE 2005
11.
Build vulnerability reduction into
food security planning.
12.
Trained “emergency core staff”
should take a lead in developing (and
periodically updating) the emergency
preparedness plan (EPP) along with
other staff.
-WBG Strat Review 2004
13.
Lack of method in entry and exit
strategies.
–Ethiopia LL workshop 2003
14.
Planning framework should
proactively address environmental
concerns.
–Kenya RAP 2001
15.
Exploit opportunities to work with
the private sector as a business
partner and as a development partner
during emergencies.
–South Africa LL 2003
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16.
Refugee and other population
movements are hard to predict;
contingency plans should therefore be
made for even the less likely
scenarios.
17.
CARE should nominate a person to
ensure that regular analysis and
scenario planning for the countries in
the Balkans region is carried out.
18.
CARE field staff should be briefed
to observe the Red Cross CoC and the
SPHERE standards.
19.
CARE should consider producing a
simple project checklist for program
managers in emergencies.

Procurement
and Logistics

–Kosovo LLR
20.
We should develop a CO –specific
contingency plan to avoid being caught
off-guard in the future.
–Sri Lanka AAR
21.
There is a need to develop
emergency procedures and staff guidance
for procurement.
– Haiti 2005
22.
Emergencies personnel deployed to
the field should have access to a 4x4
vehicle with driver and interpreter
–West Bank/Gaza RTE 2002
1. Examine and assess procurement and
logistics system in Sri Lanka.
2. Develop CARE and WV’s capacity to
handle procurement, warehousing and
logistics into a common pool for faster
response.
–India and Sri Lanka MAE 2005
3. Investigate possibilities for
collaboration (among agencies) on
procurement and capacity development
for local marketing systems.
–Indonesia and Thailand MAE 2005
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4. The purchase of materials has been most
efficient where beneficiaries and CARE
have made bulk purchases.
5. CARE WBG needs to make strategic
decisions regarding its current deep
involvement in procurement activities,
related to questions about impact and
appropriateness.
6. Longer-term planning and an exit
strategy need to be designed in WBG re:
procurement.
–WBG Strat Review
7. There is a need to select, stay with
and insist on the utilization of a
single commodity management system –
either GIMS or Scala.
–India earthquake 2001
8. CARE should develop a permanent
procurement capacity, located in
Europe, for supporting future emergency
response.
9. Emergency missions should have an
overall coordinator who can supervise
logistic procedures and ensure smooth
links between procurement, transport of
goods and warehousing.
–Kosovo LLR
10.
Vendor lists for materials
according to centers of excellence
needs to be prepared and updated
regularly.
11.
Huge increase in procurement needs
means restructuring is necessary, not
merely additional staff.
12.
Pre-arrangement of transport is
critical.
–Indonesia/Aceh AAR
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Finance

1. If time allows, use an external person
to assess CO financial management and
user requirements.
-Iraq RTE II 2003
2. Structured, formal procedures specific
to emergencies could prevent disregard
for normal procedures, such as
purchases without purchase orders.
–Haiti AAR 2005
3. Ensure that funds are efficiently used.
–Thailand and Indonesia MAE 2005
4. Administration and finance staff should
try and make regular visits to field
offices. This is especially important
for understanding operating constraints
during emergencies.
–West Bank/Gaza Strat Review 2004
5. CARE should ensure that a finance
manager is included at the start of all
emergency operations.
–Kosovo LLR
6. There is a need to safeguard against
overtaxing senior country office staff
in trying to accommodate CARE
information needs.
-Afghanistan 2002
7. A closer examination of current
division of labor and staff efficiency
/ motivation would be useful in light
of the increased workload resulting
from disaster.
-Haiti 2002
13.
If a CO lacks finance officers
with appropriate experience, CARE
should send a specialist for largescale emergency operations.
14.
CARE should ensure that CERT
finance officers know the accounts
software.
–Afghanistan 2002
15.
There was a damaging mis- or
under-utilization of standard CARE
accounting procedures.
-Haiti 2005
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Psychology and
staff wellness

1. Review and improve staff living
conditions as necessary to a reasonable
level.
2. Ensure that counseling services are
available for returning staff that have
been exposed to stressful situations.
– Darfur RTE I 2004
3. COs hosting a CERT should ensure
adequate living and office arrangements
for CERT that should facilitate teambuilding between the CERT and the CO.
–Iraq RTE II 2003
4. Affected staff had to wait 4 months to
get psychosocial support.
–Haiti AAR 2005
5. Given the high potential for mental
health disorders, consider immediate
additional means of support.
–Thailand and Indonesia MAE 2005
6. When staff are under severe
stress…management should pay close
attention to morale, through
encouragement and practical support. –
7. CARE should continue the good practice
of providing professional counselors
during emergencies.
-Kosovo LLR
8. Include psychosocial care for staff
engaged in emergency response at all
levels.
–India Tsunami AAR
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Communication

1. CI needs to define responsibilities and
standards for maintaining an acceptable
telecommunications policy.
2. Communications need to be recognized
within CI as a priority both for
security and operations; a minimum
acceptable capacity needs to be
defined.
3. Ensure staff are trained in the use of
communications equipment and systems.
--Iraq RTE II 2003
4. Put in place a strategy to disseminate
information up to the CI level.
–Haiti AAR 2005
5. CARE should ensure that it always has
full communications from the start of
an emergency.

Security

6. Strict procedures for telephone use
should be set up from the start of a
mission.
1. Having a security chain and functioning
communication at the institutional
level was essential for crisis
management.
–Haiti AAR 2005
2. CARE should require all country offices
to develop and update security
management plans.
3. CARE should train security officers to
understand their role.
4. Security decisions are best made by the
staff in the field. - -Afghanistan 2002
5. COs should ensure that security and
safety plans are in place at the
beginning of an emergency and are
regularly updated.
-Darfur RTE I 2004
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Human
Resources

6. The issuing of ID cards and having a
“full-fare, open return economy” air
ticket are security issues and must be
applied in forthcoming CERT
deployments.
–West Bank/Gaza RTE 2002
7. CARE should ensure that all vehicles in
emergencies are equipped with basic
medical kits and equipment for dealing
with vehicle accidents.
–Kosovo LLR
1. Develop documentation to orient staff
to intervention strategies such as food
distribution.
2. Establish ToR before hiring any
consultant or contractor.
3. In the future, re: international staff,
we should identify genuine needs,
define ToRs, and regularly update the
human resources bank.
–Haiti AAR 2005
4. CARE International should train local
staff in emergency mgmt skills,
especially during lulls.
5. All staff deployed in an emergency
should have a ToR agreed to in advance
with the CO. CARE should develop
standard ToRs for each of the CERT
posts.
6. CARE must ensure that staff on the CERT
roster are highly qualified and can add
value to the response.
7. –Afghanistan 2002
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8. Articulate a more strategic approach to
CERT skills selection and deployment in
the CI Emergency Manual.
9. Clarify timeframe for CERT to make it
more flexible and responsive to actual
needs
10.
Review and revision of generic
ToRs for CERT members
11.
Develop and implement a training
program for CERT staff that includes
coaching/mentoring techniques
– Iraq RTE II 2003
8. Matching criteria for selection of CERT
personnel should be sensitive to the
issue of ‘nationalism’
9. CERTs must be prepared for almost total
self-sufficiency.
10.
COs must be capacitated to know
what to expect of a CERT team if one is
deployed to their country
–West Bank/Gaza RTE 2002
11.
In all major disasters, deploy HR
staff in the field offices in the early
stages to enable local recruitment.
12.
Ensure that in-country disaster
preparedness capacity and plans are
reinforced with a strong component of
international and regional expertise so
that COs are able to scale up response
quickly by deploying optimum staff.
–India and Sri Lanka MAE 2005
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13.
Expand the collaboration potential
for regularized multi-agency training
in cross-agency areas of relevance.
14.
Strengthen human resources
policies to overcome barriers to human
resource constraints and optimal
performance
–Thailand and Indonesia MAE 2005
15.
CARE should set up and train a
Country Office core team in emergency
response.
–WBG Strat Review 2004
16.
Shadow roles and number and types
of staff needed at any given time
should be outlined before each
emergency response. –Ethiopia LL 2000
17.
Early deployment priorities should
include the rapid establishment of
communications systems and setup of
adequate accommodations for CARE staff.
18.
CARE assessment teams should be
gender balanced; PRA training would be
a plus.
–India Earthquake 2001
19.
Invest in staff and support
systems at the onset of an emergency.
–South Africa LL 2003
20.
When personnel change, a proper
hand-over of responsibilities is
essential, to ensure that the newcomer
is fully briefed about the job and is
able to benefit from the outgoing postholder’s knowledge, experience and
professional contacts.
21.
Mission Directors and human
resource managers should ensure that
all staff receive a job description.
–Kosovo LLR
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22.
Brief and train emergency officers
and partner staff in participatory and
gender analysis tools.
23.
Recruit female staff and
volunteers for assessments and other
responses.
24.
Performance management of the
deployed staff needs to be incorporated
within the Annual Performance Appraisal
process. Reward and recognition of
deployed staff needs to be developed.
–India Tsunami AAR
25.
Use generalists with flexibility
to fill gaps.
26.

Strong HR needed at all levels.

–Indonesia and Aceh Tsunami AAR
27.
HR should be involved in the
proposal development stage to assist in
staff recruitment.
28.
HR should prepare an in-house list
of staff expertise available and
develop an emergency roster.
–Garowe AAR
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29.
CARE Sri Lanka HR should make
regular visits to field offices to
communicate change processes and listen
to staff concerns.
30.
We need to find ways to build
local HR capacity and facilitate
regional recruitment.
31.
HR to monitor conditions of
inequity and ensure staff concerns are
heard.
32.
CI should maintain an active
roster of CVs of people who can be
called upon when an emergency arises.
33.
CARE USA should dedicate a fulltime person to emergency recruitment
and placement in emergency situations.
–Sri Lanka AAR
34.
Better define the profiles and
competencies needed for personnel
engaged in emergency operations,
including data management officers and
warehouse managers.
35.
Train CARE personnel in EPP and
existing protocols
--Niamey AAR 2005
36.
At least one senior decision-maker
should visit at the beginning of an
emergency operation to aid
communication.
–Afghanistan 2002
37.
Senior staff should visit crisis
areas early and regularly.
–Darfur RTE 2004
38.
We need to build capacity in the
field to decentralize to regional
offices by enhancing the authority
level. –Sri Lanka AAR
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39.
Visits by senior management should
take place as close to the beginning of
an emergency as possible.

Information
Management

Policy and
Advocacy

Iraq RTE II 2003
40.
Apply new information management
procedures as soon as possible.
–West Bank/Gaza RTE 2002
41.
Info management is critical in an
emergency and must be developed prior
to a disaster.
–India Earthquake 2001
1. Establish MIS inventory to identify
what type of information is already
being collected and how, and what
information is/is not available.
–South Africa LL 2003
2. CARE, UN agencies, donors and govt need
to establish clear reporting lines,
managed by a centralized body using a
standard format.
–South Africa LL 2003
3. Contingency plan should address what
advocacy issues CARE should raise.
4. CERT should deploy an advocacy
specialist early in an emergency
response if there is not an individual
with this expertise on the ground
already.
-Afghanistan 2002
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5. Critical capacities, such as advocacy
and policy analysis, should not be
attached to ad hoc structures.
6. Add an advocacy and policy analysis
“box” to the aCERT organigram and
identify a focal point from within CI
membership to take on responsibility
for developing and maintaining the
required capacity.
7. CARE should aim to develop a more
focused strategy on advocacy during
emergencies via a CO or CERT focal
point.
8. There should be an understanding that
the preparation of scripts for
congressional testimonies or other
high-level representation be done in
close consultation with the CO. --Iraq
RTE II 2003
1. Devote additional resources to
advocacy.
2. Advocacy for land rights.
–Thailand and Indonesia MAE 2005
3. Advocacy on the right to access to
adequate quality and quantity of water
4. Advocacy should be professional, should
be based on our own work and direct
experience.
5. Legal advice in terms of RBA is needed
–WBG Strat Review 2004
6. A key CARE role should be advocacy for
disaster victims to inform them about
their rights for relief and
rehabilitation.
–India earthquake 2001
7. CARE should agree on a global policy
defining its relationship with the
military.
-Kosovo LLR
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Decision
Making

8. Appeals and SitReps were important
advocacy tools with donors and lead
CARE bodies; the appeal mechanism
should be institutionalized.
-India Tsunami AAR
9. Develop an advocacy strategy for the
emergency response. –Niamey AAR 2005
10.
CARE Lead Members should state the
lines of authority at the beginning of
an operation.
–Afghanistan 2002
11.
The CO should have an emergency
contingency plan with clear
responsibilities and lines of
communication laid out. –Haiti 2005
1. Develop training program for CERT staff
that includes exposure to a variety of
operations within various COs,
especially different financial and
administrative systems.
2. A senior CI staff representative should
facilitate adjustments and/or
clarifications of roles and
responsibilities of CO and CERT staff.
-Iraq RTE II 2003
3. Plan a meeting of all program staff
immediately after a disaster to
delegate and clarify each person’s
tasks.
–Haiti AAR 2005
4. Set up a contingency emergency plan
that is pyramidal; ensure communication
about the new structure and involve the
community in decision-making.
5. At the beginning, lines of
responsibility and leadership for
managing the emergency were not well
established, leading to frustration and
delays.
–Haiti AAR 2005
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6. Reporting lines within a CO should be
re-articulated as soon as possible
after arrival of external emergency
response personnel
–West Bank/Gaza RTE 2002
7. Ensure senior managers in CO and
districts take responsibility for and
participate in all coordination fora
– India and Sri Lanka MAE 2005
8. We need a common position…the problem
is to know who does and decides what in
the CARE network. We need someone to
prepare (an advocacy) paper, circulate
it, and get agreement.
–WBG Strat Review 2004
9. Roles and responsibilities of
representatives should be clearly
defined before emergency ops to promote
clear understanding of roles; validate
at time of emergency.
–Ethiopia LL 2000
10.
CARE, UN agencies, donors and govt
need to establish clear reporting
lines, managed by a centralized body
using a standard format.
–South Africa LL 2003
11.
Lead or Temporary Coordinating
Member and their country offices should
take responsibility for monitoring
potential emergencies; CARE should
decide where responsibility lies for
analysis and contingency planning when
there is no Lead or Coordinating
member.
Project managers should be briefed
12.
on all their responsibilities, and
preferably equipped with a checklist of
these.
-Kosovo LLR
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13.

Clarify decision making structure.

14.
There should be proper authority
delegation to make decisions at the
field level.

Evaluation and
Learning

–Garowe AAR
15.
Delegation of authority to field
offices in the early phases has been
empowering for staff. We need to ensure
the delegation of authority is
systematized.
–Sri Lanka AAR
16.
Define and clarify the roles and
responsibilities, in terms of
preparation, response, communication,
and training, of CO, CARE USA, CEG, and
CI.
–Niamey AAR 2005
1. CARE International should include
application of lessons previously
learned in future ToRs.
2. CARE should audit emergency operations
within 3 to 4 months of the start of
the operation.
-Afghanistan 2002
3. CARE should make use of the Sudan
experience to develop a “good practice”
guide for humanitarian protection
activities.
4. Ensure that adequate resources for
learning are built into project budgets
to improve timeliness and effectiveness
of M&E events.
-–Darfur RTE I 2004
1. Encourage COs to allocate adequate
resources in project budgets to cover
costs for lessons-learned sessions and
M&E activities.
– Iraq RTE II 2003
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2. We should promote a culture of
continuous reflection and willingness
to make modifications…
3. We should identify a focal point for
early collection, processing and
analysis of data.
4. SPHERE standards should be adopted and
applied in the future.
-Haiti AAR 2005
5. How can CARE disseminate and share
learning from successful shelter work
in Sri Lanka?
6. Ongoing monitoring of watsan data in
India will be important.
–Sri Lanka/India MAE 2005
7. The Inter-Agency Working Group should
look into putting monitoring expertise
on the ground in the early stages of an
emergency to assist with establishing
M&E systems.
–Thailand and Indonesia MAE 2005
8. Improve the level of household-level
qualitative analysis.
9. Improve monitoring o f impact in
projects by including indicators, peer
and inter-agency reviews, etc., and
staff training in these methods.
–WBG Strat Review 2004
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10.
Need for methodology / clear
guideline for monitoring food
distribution activities.
11.
During impact evaluation, CARE
should study whether beneficiaries felt
that the food aid they received was
appropriate or not.
12.
Absence of guidelines for
evaluating emergency response limited
initial learning and assessment of
impact and further impacts design of
future interventions
–Ethiopia LL 2000
13.
Assessment of needs should also
include the assessment of local
capacities and coping mechanisms to
inform and guide external
interventions.
– India earthquake 2001
14.
Establish a DM&E unit and a DM&E
coordinator at a CARE CO level, as well
as M&E Manager at a project level.
Establish standard formats for M&E
15.
systems across projects.
Project budgets should include the
16.
cost of a full time DM&E manager and
shared costs of DM&E coordinator.
17.
Include field-based learning
events for CARE and partners in project
design and budget
–South Africa LL 2003

183

18.
CARE needs to insist, with donors
and amongst its members, on rigorous
assessment before committing itself to
an emergency program.
19.
CARE projects need to be
accompanied by an effective system that
regularly assesses the impact of its
activities in beneficiaries.
20.
CARE members should do their own
internal evaluations as to which
sectors of their recruitment performed
well and which less well, with a view
to making improvements as necessary. –
Kosovo LLR
21.
Collect and solicit data
disaggregated by sex to understand
composition of surviving families.
22.
Assessment reports should reflect
the needs for different phases.
23.
Capture the lessons learnt in the
current and previous disasters to form
a base for future programming.
24.
Monitoring should include impact
indicators.
–India tsunami AAR
25.
Thus far we are consistently
monitoring at the output level only. We
should more consistently collect and
analyze quality data.
26.
Develop M&E framework / strategy
for working in emergencies.
-Sri Lanka AAR
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27.
There should be a formal process
of sharing experiences with other
organizations working on the tsunami
response.
28.
Clear achievement indicators and
reporting formats are needed
–Thailand AAR
29.
Establish and reinforce monitoring
and evaluation in emergency plans.
30.
Develop a working group that will
assure the utilization of lessons
learned and the development of a
nutrition strategy for crisis and noncrisis periods.
–Niamey AAR 2005
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APPENDIX C
CARE Organigram
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APPENDIX D

Interview Protocol, Use of Evaluations
1. From your perspective, what are the critical events
where planning takes place?

a. What are the major meetings, workshops, retreats,
etc., where planning takes place for your job?

b. From your perspective, at what key events does
planning take place for CARE as a whole?

c. Is most planning done in a routine, regular
fashion, or are there ad hoc meetings where major
planning occurs? Explain.

2.

Who are the main participants for the key planning

events you described?

a. Who organizes the events?

b. Who facilitates the events?

c. Who determines the content of the events?
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d. Who is present for the events?

3. Where do these events tend to occur? How long do they
last?

4. During these key meetings, routine or ad-hoc, has the
discussion included emergency response or capacity
building?

a. On a policy level?

i. If so, what was the context?

ii. If so, were any decisions made on a policy
level?

b. On an operations level?

i. If so, what was the context?

ii. If so, were any decisions made on an
operations level?
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c. When it is necessary to decide between several
courses of action, how do you prioritize what to
focus on?

5. Are evaluation findings an information source for these
planning events?

a. do you regularly receive or have easy access to
evaluation findings from disasters and emergencies?
Where would you go to find such information if you
wanted it?

b. Are “lessons learned” incorporated into discussions
about the future at major planning events?
c. Do certain “lessons” or types of lessons get used
more than others? If so, why and how?

d. Have you been involved in any disaster or
emergency-related evaluations?

i. If so, what was the context and what was your
role?
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ii. If so, were you enthusiastic about the
impending evaluation, or were you reluctant? Why?

6. Are lessons-learned being used appropriately and to
effect for planning? If not, how could this be improved?

a. do the appropriate people have access to lessonslearned?

b. are lessons-learned put in a format that is easy to
use and understand? If not, what would help?

c. are lessons learned received

in a format that is

easy to read and use? If not, how would you change the
format?

d. is the timing of the delivery of lessons-learned
such that they are immediately useful? If not, how
could timing be improved?

7. Do you have other remarks or suggestions for improving
the use of evaluation reports?
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